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INLucE TuA
In Thy Light
An Advent Fast

A

NOTHER ELECTION IS BEHIND US. '~ND

there was much rejoicing:' American
election campaigns have evolved into
marathons that test the endurance of both candidates and voters. If not everyone is happy with the
outcome, everyone at least is happy when they are
over. The candidates spend months on the road
giving speeches, working the crowds, and raising
money. We as voters only have to watch, listen, and
make up our minds. That ought to be easy enough,
but we still find the process a burden. In my experience, this campaign was no worse than others.
Of course, it had its share of negativity, mendacity,
and absurdity, but when people complain about
our ugly elections, I remember political scientist
Samuel Popkin's observation: if American politics
are vulgar it is because Americans are vulgar. Our
politicians are no fools. We might tell them that
we want a modern-day version of the LincolnDouglas debates, but they know that we would
not watch the Lincoln-Douglas debates even if
they came in an iPhone app. They also know what
actually makes us pay attention, what gets us
excited, and what kinds of things we remember.
Campaigns are crass, ugly, and loud, because we
respond to them when they are that way.
But now the campaigns are finally silent,
and just in time, because the Christmas noise is
well underway. A few radio stations start playing Christmas music as early as November 1, but
our holiday observances really get started every
year when Americans finish giving thanks for all
the blessings in their lives just in time to rush off
and go shopping. Almost no one is happy that
the Christmas season gets started so early. This
year, stores like Target and Wal-Mart were widely
criticized for launching their Black Friday sales

on Thanksgiving Thursday, but the stores were
as full as ever and labor union protests against
retailers had little impact. I am tempted to paraphrase Popkin: if Christmas is vulgar, it is because
Christians are vulgar. If Christmas is not what it
should be, maybe we should stop blaming capitalists, or the "War on Christmas;' or whomever. If
there is something wrong with Christmas, perhaps the fault is our own.
The time of year called "the Christmas season"
is also known as Advent. Advent was once a time
of repentance and fasting, a season of preparation
during which we simplified our lives and awaited
the coming of the Lord. It has since become a
time of excess and consumption. We overeat,
overspend, and generally overdo it. But if we no
longer fast from food, there are other fasts we
might undertake. In "Thinking about Thinking;'
Harold K. Bush proposes a digital fast. For a couple of days each week, shut the computer off and
leave the smartphone behind. Give your brain a
rest from electronic stimulation. And after reading Jennifer Forness's reflections on the absence of
silence in contemporary music ("Turn That Stuff
Down"), I have decided that this Advent I need a
noise fast. Noise, like many other kinds of physical
stimulation, is addictive. We surround ourselves
with artificial noise: music constantly in the background, television news and sports that we mostly
ignore anyway, and the constant beeping and
buzzing of various gadgets.
If we can turn down the noise, we might be
able to hear something much more important.
Without all the artificial noise, we will be better
able to hear the real sounds created by people and
places near and dear to us. As Josef Pieper wrote in
Leisure: Ihe Basis of Culture, "only the silent hear
and those who do not remain silent do not hear:'
When we are silent, we can experience the world
and God's presence in it. So many things come and
go noisily, hurling themselves at our senses and
disappearing as soon as the next one pushes them
aside. But at the Nativity, God the Eternal comes
into our world as God the Incarnate and comes to
us as a child born in the silence of night. During
Advent, we wait and listen for this God. 1
-]PO
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The Scientist's Finger

Thomas Cathcart

P

AUL TILLICH USED TO TELL HIS CLASSES

about a scientist at Harvard who
approached him to say he would not be
attending Tillich's public lecture that evening
because he knew it would be irrational. Tillich
invited him to "please come, sit in the front row,
and anytime I say something you think is irrational, raise your finger, so I will know:' "No;' said
the scientist, "I would have my finger raised the
whole time:'
And then Tillich would laugh. We thought he
was probably laughing at the absurdity of what the
scientist said. But it occurs to me now that perhaps
he was laughing instead at a sort of cosmic joke.
Perhaps what struck him funny is that the scientist
had pinpointed the nature of the dialogue, or lack
thereof, between people of faith and people outside the community of faith.
Tillich famously wrote that theology occurs
only within the circle of faith, that it is by, and
principally for, those who are already grasped by
faith. Looked at from outside the circle of faith,
theological statements are in a sense irrational.
In Christian terms, if you are not grasped by the
power ofJesus as the Christ, no amount of theologizing will convert you.
Karl Barth thought this meant that theology
has little to say to those outside the circle, but
Tillich was unwilling to go that far. He thought
that clarifying the questions of human existence
and showing how they correspond to assertions
of faith can sometimes open up a space in which
genuine dialogue between the church and the
world becomes possible, a dialogue that can sometimes even remove a barrier to faith.
6
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People Have Faith in God Because They Want To

We will take a look at an extreme instance, a
statement that looks totally different from inside
and outside the circle of faith and see if elucidation can create the possibility of dialogue:
"People have faith in God because they
want to:'
Who was the author of this statement? Was it
Freud, who thought religions are wish-fulfilling
illusions? Or perhaps Marx, who called religion
the opiate of the masses? Or was it Nietzsche, who
thought Christianity springs from resentment
of the strong by the weak? Or perhaps Richard
Dawkins, the contemporary biologist, who called
one of his books The God Delusion?
Actually, these words-"People have faith
in God because they want to" -were spoken by
Dorothy Day, co-founder of the Catholic Worker
movement.
"People have faith in God because they want
to?" What could she have meant? Was she capitulating to the taunts of the agnostics and atheists
of her day? Was she unaware of the seeming
irrationality of what she said? If we were "new
atheists;' we would certainly pounce on her statement as evidence of the wish-fulfilling character
of religious faith. What could make it clearer that
religion is an irrational attempt to fashion a God
from our own desires?
As it happens, we don't know exactly what
Dorothy Day had in mind, but the notion that
people have faith in God because they want to

just may contain the secret of religious faith. It
is a secret that the faithful tacitly understand,
although often through a glass darkly. It is also a
secret that, even when revealed, has been unpersuasive to millions of people throughout history
and perhaps to most people in the northern hemisphere in our day. Indeed, how one reacts to this
secret may indicate whether one is inside or outside the circle of faith.
Much has been written recently about the
difference between faith and belief; Harvey Cox,
for example, has written an entire book about that
difference (The Future of Faith, 2009). In both the
Bible and much of Christian history, we find that
faith is not synonymous with "belief;' at least not
in the metaphysical sense that one believes or
does not believe in Santa Claus or the tooth fairy.
Rather, faith is synonymous with "trust:' Faith in
God means trust in God.
In English, we do sometimes use the word
"faith" to mean belief, but we also use the word in
several other ways. If I say, "I have faith in myself;'
I do not, of course, mean that I believe that I exist;
I mean that I have a basic trust, or confidence, in
myself. When, as a Red Sox fan, I tried to "keep
the faith" during the eighty-six years without a
World Series victory, I was not trying to believe
that a team called the Red Sox exists-although
there were years when one had to wonder. What I
really meant was that I should not give up the trust
that next year or the year after might be The Year.
We will leave aside temporarily the obvious
issue of whether "trust in God" necessarily implies
a metaphysical belief in the existence of an entity
called "God" -that is to say, the Santa Claus question. It is, of course, a question on which religious
thought has often foundered. Before we can examine that question, however, it is important to know
exactly what we mean by faith or trust in God.
The way the synoptic gospels and Acts pose
the issue of faith is: do you trust in the "good
news"? Mark's gospel, for example, has Jesus begin
his ministry by announcing, "The time is fulfilled,
and the kingdom of God has come near; repent,
and believe in [pisteuete, trust in] the good news"
(Mark 1:15, NRSV). The early Christians went so
far as to name some of their most important texts
"good newses:' So what is this good news? Why is

it news, and why is it good? And the most difficult
question: what does it mean to trust in it?
The answers to these questions, of course, fill
entire libraries, but the basic answer to what the
good news is, is really rather simple. The good
news is that we are accepted into the Kingdom of
God. That's it. We are accepted.
Why is this news? It is news because deep
down people of faith know they are unacceptable.
We have now entered very dangerous waters.
Sin has gotten a bad name, so to speak, in the last

Faith is not synonymous with
"belief;' at least not in the
metaphysical sense that one believes
or does not believe in Santa Claus
or the tooth fairy. Rather, faith is
synonymous with "trust:'

century, replaced by psychological "issues:' What
do you mean, you're unacceptable? Isn't that neurotic? Morbid? A delusion of grandeur? As if your
pathetic peccadilloes amount to anything as grand
as unacceptability! Unacceptable to whom? To
yourself? Then deal with it. To your parents? See
a psychotherapist. Isn't this feeling of being unacceptable just a manifestation of what Nietzsche
saw as the self-loathing of the weak? Real men
don't feel unacceptable.
These are all legitimate questions and criticisms, and, unfortunately, they often point to a
sad truth. Millions of people do harbor neurotic,
morbid, self-loathing experiences of unworthiness, and hundreds of thousands of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and other mental health workers
have emerged to try to help these people sort out
the unconscious or interpersonal sources of these
feelings.
People of faith, however, feel that there is
also a non-neurotic sense in which they are
Advent/Christmas 2012
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unacceptable. It stems from our human ability
to see ourselves and our lives, as Spinoza put it,
sub specie aeternitatis: that is, "from the point of
view of eternity:' Whenever we ask, "What does
my life add up to anyway?" we are speaking sub
specie aeternitatis. (How else could a life "add up"
to anything except when seen as a whole and,
metaphorically speaking, "from above"?) When
we ask ourselves whether we are living up to our
ideals, we are speaking sub specie aeternitatis.
(Ideals reside, after all, in "Plato's heaven;' beyond
space and time.) When we feel guilty, we may be
exhibiting neurosis, but we may also be speaking sub specie aeternitatis. We may be feeling that
we are not the persons we were somehow "meant
to be" (Aristotle) or that we are not our ideal
selves (Plato) or that we are "fallen" (Judaism and
Christianity).
Tillich's scientist might object that stating our
feeling of unacceptability in this way-as stemming from seeing ourselves from the standpoint
of eternity-is to already be speaking the language of faith, and that is correct. To someone
who professes not to know what "the standpoint
of eternity" could possibly mean or who thinks
that it is an illusion, or to someone who thinks
the question, "What does my life add up to?" is
meaningless or a result of linguistic confusion,
or to someone who simply doesn't care, there is
no answer. Answers of faith can only be given to
questions of faith. In other words, this is one juncture at which some people will opt out of the circle
of faith. As we will see, there are many other such
junctures. But our question is: Is it less rational to
think that looking at one's life sub specie aeternitatis is legitimate than to think that it is not? It is the
question of the scientist's finger, and it is a question that each person must answer for himself.
What can be said about people who do
experience the question of their own worth as a
legitimate question? In particular, what can be
said about the subset of those people who, upon
examining themselves, find themselves unacceptable? First of all, what do they mean? And why do
they not consider their experience of unworthiness a neurotic symptom?
Some people feel unworthy because they have
deviated from some societal norm, but the more
8
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interesting case for our purpose is people who may
or may not have deviated from social norms but
who know they are, in some way, untrustworthy.
They may have actually broken a trust. They may
have betrayed a person who placed her trust in
them. They may have placed their own interest
before that of their own children and witnessed a
sad or even tragic outcome as their children developed or didn't. They may feel they are in someone
else's debt, perhaps even that they owe another
person a debt that can never be repaid, because
the harm has been done and can never be undone.
No matter how much remorse they have, they
know the toothpaste can never be put back in the
tube. They may have fallen into a cycle of addiction that makes them a stranger to themselves and
those who loved and trusted them. They may have
been tested and responded in a cowardly way. If
they have not actually violated a trust, they may
know nonetheless that under the right circumstances they would. This is the experience that
Kierkegaard called being pursued by the hound of
heaven. It is to take what Alcoholics Anonymous
calls "a searching and fearless moral inventory of
ourselves" and to face the fact that we are not worthy of our own trust. We have not kept faith with
our own potential. We are not the god we hoped to
be-or perhaps assumed we were.
Therapy will not help such people. They do
not want their self-insight to be medicated or,
indeed, to be "cured" of it. In fact, they despise
the fact that they often allow themselves to fall
asleep to the ways in which they fall short of their
own ego ideal. They feel compelled to affirm, with
Kierkegaard, that "this is required of everyone,
that before God [that is, sub specie aeternitatis],
he shall candidly humble himself in view of the
requirements of ideality" (Kierkegaard 1972: 71).
This is a juncture at which many more people opt out of the circle of faith. They may be
people who do not take self-inventories for whatever reason, perhaps because they consider such
assessments neurotic. They may be people who
can honestly say that they never suffered from
the delusion that they are a god. They may be
people who can honestly say they find no cowardice in themselves. They may be people who
make occasional or frequent self-assessments,

but find themselves basically acceptable: "no
worse than anyone else" or "on balance, good and
decent people" or "understandably inconsistent,
given human nature:' People of faith should not
be quick to judge these people. It may be tempting to think the non-guilty have simply not heard
the bad news yet, but the safer course is to simply
say, as Jesus did, "Those who have ears to hear, let
them hear;' and "Those who are well have no need
of a physician:' Again, Alcoholics Anonymous is
helpful: don't take someone else's inventory.
It is enough that the person of faith take his
or her own inventory. And when he does, he is
troubled. To use the ancient metaphor, he feels
that he is "stained" in some way. He feels that there
are parts of himself that he would not want to see
the light of day, characteristics of himself that he
would not put in his memoir, shadow qualities that
he tries his best to hide in his everyday presentation of self, parts that he tries to hide even from
himself. He acknowledges that he has hurt other
people, perhaps irreparably, by putting his own
interests before what he knows is good and right.
He is aware that those closest to him know that in
many ways he is a coward and a fraud. Perhaps he
can make amends for some of his behavior, but he
has to admit that he would not blame the people he
has harmed if they were unable fully to trust him
again. He is not even sure he fully trusts himself.
Is such a self-assessment irrational? Is it neurotic? Again, each person must decide for himself.
The next step for the person of faith, however,
is irrational. It is at this point that Tillich's scientist
should raise his finger. What the person pursued
by the hound of heaven is in need of is forgiveness.
Only forgiveness-the wiping clean of his slatecan help the person with a troubled conscience.
And forgiveness is at its core irrational.
What is rational is "an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth:' What is rational is that the
righteous brother of the prodigal son should be
rewarded, not the prodigal! What is rational is that
the laborers in the vineyard who started work at
dawn should be paid more than those who came
at the eleventh hour. That is what makes sense.
Forgiveness does not make sense. It isn't fair.
What makes the good news good? Nothing,
if you are the righteous brother. It is the worst

news possible. If you are the brother who played
by the rules all his life, who always did the acceptable thing, who maintained all his relationships
responsibly even when the going got tough, it is
understandably infuriating that the brother who
trashed his relationships and wasted his life in
debauchery gets the feast. And yet the person of
faith experiences that he is forgiven and accepted,
that all his debts have been cancelled. When he
expresses this in the language of religious symholism, he says, "God is like the father in the

What the person pursued by the
hound of heaven is in need of is
forgiveness. Only forgivenessthe wiping clean of his slate-can
help the person with a troubled
conscience. And forgiveness
is at its core irrational.

parable. God forgives and accepts me, not because
I deserve it or because I am basically okay, but
because he loves me beyond reason, as a father
or mother loves a child:' As Tillich put it, we find
ourselves accepted, not because we are acceptable,
but in spite of our being unacceptable.
This is irrational, not just because we have
now introduced the idea of God and raised the
Santa Claus question, but more fundamentally
because forgiveness is itself irrational. It would
be irrational for a person convicted of a crime
to expect that he will be immediately set free,. It
would be irrational for a borrower to expect the
lender to simply write off her debt. Both law and
ethics rest on the idea of moral consequences for
our actions. Forgiveness is an apparent acte gratuit, a gratuitous, off-the-wall event, not subject to
any rational rule.
But what if forgiveness were seen, not merely
as a judgment on the past, but as a creator of the
future? As it happens, that is faith's view of the fact
Advent/Christmas 2012
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of forgiveness. It is not that the prodigal son cleans
up his act and is therefore forgiven. It is the other
way around. It is only possible for a prodigal son to
clean up his act because he finds himself forgivenor, as in the story, because he has faith that he will
be. Otherwise, he could never have gone home.
Forgiveness does not merely judge the old
situation; it creates a new situation. The New
Testament is full of metaphors for this phenomenon of faith. John has Jesus say that we can be
born again. Paul says that we are a new creation,
that we die to our old selves and are resurrected
as a new self. But isn't it irrational-indeed, delu-

The mark of genuine forgiveness
is that we forgive. Forgive us our
debts as we forgive our debtors.

sional-to trust that the utterly new can happen,
that a new future can be handed to us? Well, perhaps it would be-if it hadn't happened to us.
But what about our acceptance of being
accepted? Isn't that necessarily suspect? Are we
simply letting ourselves off the hook, deluding
ourselves that we have "been accepted" so that
we can rid ourselves of our burden of guilt? This
is another juncture at which people may understandably opt out of the circle of faith. They may
judge that those who "experience forgiveness" are
really only excusing themselves and covering up
the self-serving nature of their bogus act of faith,
hiding it from themselves to lend legitimacy to
the experience. This is a sincere and damning
objection, and the person of faith must wrestle
constantly with it.
The New Testament's answer is that it is the
future that will tell the tale. The unmerciful servant in the parable has his debt cancelled by his
master, only to grab his own debtor by the throat
and demand repayment. The mark of whether
we have truly experienced the magnitude of our
being accepted is how we behave toward those in
debt to us. The mark of genuine forgiveness is that
10
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we forgive. Forgive us our debts as we forgive our
debtors.
Perhaps, though, it is fraudulent to accept
acceptance even if it does eventuate in our being
merciful to others. How dare we attribute our own
excusing of ourselves to having received divine
pardon?
Because faith is a sort of confidence, an analysis of the logic of confidence may shed some light
on the phenomenon of religious faith. Many adolescents struggle with issues of self-confidence.
It is easy to see why this is so. It is impossible to
perform well without confidence, but it seems
impossible to have confidence without foreknowledge that you will perform well. Without
confidence, adolescents spiral downward, becoming more awkward and consequently even less
confident. With confidence, adolescents spiral
upward, becoming less awkward and consequently
even more confident. What determines which way
an adolescent develops is an acte gratuit, something external that breaks the cycle, breaks into
the cycle, and determines its direction. Perhaps
it is the blind love of a parent or the interest of
a teacher. Perhaps it is dumb luck: the adolescent
succeeds at something "in spite of himself" and
is thereby launched in an upward spiral of confidence and success. Or perhaps she has had early
successes based on her particular set of inherited
or developed skills, and it never occurs to her that
her competence in any other sphere is a terrifyingly open question. In any case, the determining
factor is always something external to the cycle
of confidence. The adolescent is given the wherewithal to break the cycle. Through no merit of
her own, she is handed a get-out-of-jail-free card.
Here Tillich's scientist can raise his finger again.
Confidence-trust, faith-in ourselves is always
in the end dependent on something that cannot
be rationally derived from the situation itself. No
amount of saying "Be confident!" to oneself can
produce confidence. It is a gift.
The same is true of the faith to accept acceptance. Such faith is not a judgment based on a
single experience of feeling accepted. People
"grow in faith:' When you experience yourself
as forgiven, you may find you are no longer an
unmerciful servant. On the contrary, you may

find yourself freed to be merciful to others. In this
way, you participate in creating a new situation,
for yourself and for someone else. This freedom
in turn strengthens your trust in the fact that you
have inexplicably been given a gift, a clean slate,
cleared of the smudge of your own past.
This scenario is obviously fraught with the
possibility of doubt. The chief question is why
you would deserve this gift. The answer is that
you do not. Then why should you allow yourself
to accept such a gift? Because you want to. Is this
a wish-fulfilling fantasy? Or is it that you want to
so badly that you are willing to pay the ultimate
price, which is letting go of your own wishes, giving up all effort to justify yourself, all effort to
think well of yourself, all pride? Perhaps you want
to because thriving, flourishing, growing, creating
feel to you to be at the heart of human existence,
and if accepting the gift of acceptance allows you
to flourish and to participate in creating a new self
and new relationships and a new world, you feel
there is nothing to be said but thank you.
The Santa Claus Question

Thank you to whom? Acceptance by whom? Is
it not demanded of people of faith that they believe
in the existence of some supernatural being who,
among other things, accepts them? This is the
question that in recent centuries has produced
more rhetoric than any other religious question,
most of it rather silly.
The first thing to be said is that all religious
language is, as Tillich says, symbolic. Do we really
at this late date need to say that when we speak of
God as creator, we are not positing an alternative
to the Big Bang? That when we speak of human
beings having been created in the image of God,
we are not proposing an alternative to evolution?
These questions were sorted out in principle in the
eighteenth century (although of course neither the
Big Bang nor the theory of evolution had yet been
proposed).
The Enlightenment skeptics are often said to
have won these arguments, and that is certainly
true; but the deeper truth is that, when the skeptics won, humanity won. When we take religious
symbols literally, we do an injustice not only to

reason, but also to faith. The doctrine of biblical
inerrancy is not only irrational; it is blasphemous.
The reason these literalistic questions persist
three hundred years after the Enlightenment is
that people of faith have not done a very good job
of answering a key question: if religious language
is not to be taken literally, how is it to be taken?
What sort of validity could it possibly have? How
does it differ from fantasy?
It is tempting to think that perhaps people of
faith should simply stop at the point at which we
have arrived. Perhaps it is enough to speak only of
our own existential experience of being accepted
without adopting any particular religious symbols
of the source of our acceptance. There are several
religious traditions that take this tack, from the
Theravada Buddhist experience of the Void to the
Hindu practice of neti neti (not this, not this) to
the Western medieval "way of negation;' the via
negativa. The problem, as Tillich says, is that this
is not a space in which most of us can live. Most of
us are like the man in the parable who was cleansed
of an unclean spirit; when it found his soul swept
clean, it brought along seven other unclean spirits and moved back in. To put it another way: for
most of us, the alternative to calling the source of
our new life "Thou" is to call it "me:' But putting
myself in the place of God is the very worldview
that brought on my self-alienation, my experience
of being unacceptable, in the first place. "Thou"
expresses the experienced radical otherness of the
source of our acceptance. "It is a fearful thing to
fall into the hands of the living God:' "Thou" also
expresses the living relationship the person of faith
feels to the source of his new life.
Who is this Thou? We can only answer symbolically. "He" is like a father whose prodigal son
has returned to him. "He" is like a vineyard owner
who chooses to pay the workers who arrived late
in the day the same amount as those who worked
all day. "He" is like a shepherd who leaves the
ninety-nine sheep to find the lost one. "He" is like
a master who distributes money in the expectation that it will not be put in the ground but will
be put to use in order to make it grow. "He" is like
a lender who especially loves the debtor for whom
he forgave the greater debt. "She" is like a hen that
gathers her brood under her wings.
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That is all very well, says our scientist, but
does he or she exist? In a word, no.
Entities exist. God is not an entity, not a
"being alongside other beings" (Tillich). At this
juncture people of faith struggle for language. God
is being-itself or the ground of being (Aquinas).
God is the power of being (Tillich). In biblical language, God is the Creator of all being. In a sense,
all such language is irrational. That is, it resides at
the boundary of rational discourse.
Heidegger's question, "Why are there beings
rather than nothing?" does not mean, "What is
the cause in the chain of causation that produces
being?" It means, "What is it about this power of
being that distinguishes it from nothing; what is it
that 'overcomes' nothingness?" At the organic level,
what is the elan vital that (fleetingly) favors life over
death? What is the mysterious power to heal and
to grow? At the level of our libido, as well as our
intellectual and spiritual striving, what is this irresistible desire that drives us beyond stasis? At the
level of our relationships with other persons, what
is the drive that makes us want to deepen them? At
the noetic level, what is it about the strange power
of consciousness that allows it to be conscious of
itself? At the spiritual level, what is the power that
makes it possible for us to accept transformation
and go on despite our anxiety and despair? To the
religious imagination, these manifestations of the
power of being are all aspects of one power; call it
the power of self-transcendence at every level of the
chain of being. Is this irrational? Well, it is certainly
non-rational. Rational argument can never demonstrate that we should relate to the self-transcendent
power of being in a personal or spiritual way. That
is a personal decision. Are there rational criteria for
making that decision? No. We either experience it
as a gift or we do not.
In the past, people stood more firmly within
a historical tradition in which their forebears had
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defined themselves by the particularities of their
relationship to the power of being. Now for the
first time in human history, multiple historical
traditions, sacred and secular, have become accessible to us. We cannot escape the frightening task
of taking a personal stand. Kierkegaard called it
by a very different word; he called it a leap, the
leap of faith. In a sense, the reason we leap in one
direction rather than any of the myriad others is
"because we want to:' And the reason we want to
is that we have received a gift.
Our scientist is perhaps right after all to keep
his finger in the air the whole time. ~

Thomas Cathcart studied with Paul Tillich
as both an undergraduate and a graduate
student in the 1960s. He is co-author, with
Daniel Klein, of the New York Times bestseller, Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar:
Understanding Philosophy through Jokes, as
well as Heidegger and a Hippo Walk through
Those Pearly Gates: Using Philosophy (and
Jokes!) to Explore Life, Death, the Afterlife,
and Everything In Between.
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Arrested Development
The Films of Kenneth Lonergan
Fredrick Barton

B

Y THE TIME HE WAS THIRTY- EIGHT YEARS

old in 2000, Kenneth Lonergan was already
an established playwright with enough
New York productions and award nominations on
his resume to constitute a distinguished career for
a man two decades his senior. He had also already
dipped his toe into the more financially lucrative
world of Hollywood by selling his spec script for
the mob comedy Analyze This (1999) that eventually starred Billy Crystal and Robert De Niro.
Then Lonergan wrote and directed You Can Count
on Me (2000), a film that was both a commercial
success and a critical smash. You Can Count on Me
won the Grand Jury Prize at Sundance, along with
a score of other awards and landed Oscar nominations for star Laura Linney and for Lonergan's
screenplay. Those of us who love movies in general, and You Can Count on Me in particular,
couldn't wait to see what Lonergan did next. Two
years later, he landed another screenwriting Oscar
nomination for Martin Scorsese's Gangs of New
York (2002), and he returned to the New York
stage with so much success that he was hailed in
certain quarters as the nation's most important
playwright of the last two decades.
But where was that next movie, not for hire,
but for himself? Where was the follow up to You
Can Count on Me? The answer: in Hollywood
hell. Shortly after finishing his work on Gangs
of New York, Lonergan undertook the writing of
the film that would be released a long time later
as Margaret (20ll). His reputation was such that
he attracted A-list filmmakers Sydney Pollack and
Scott Rudin as his producers and was granted the
special privilege of authority over the "final cut;'

as long as he delivered an edited film of no longer
than 150 minutes. That length restriction eventually became a stumbling block of Himalayan
proportions.
Lonergan worked on the Margaret script for
two years, revisiting many of the themes he had
first raised in You Can Count on Me. But when he
began shooting in the summer of 2005, he had a
screenplay for a three-hour film that he hoped he
could reduce to the required 150 minutes in the
editing suite. This proved to be a horrible miscalculation. Despite two years of post-production
efforts, Lonergan just wasn't able to cut the material to contracted length. The result was several
lawsuits by investors that further held up the film's
release. Lonergan ended up having to borrow several hundred thousand dollars from his friend
and collaborator Matthew Broderick. His mentor,
Scorsese, was eventually brought in to produce
a 160-minute cut, an undertaking of loyalty and
friendship that came to naught when investors
rejected Scorsese's efforts, some have said just to
punish Lonergan. Sufficient compromises were
finally achieved, and Margaret was released in
September 20ll, if you can call being shown in
one theater in New York and one in Los Angeles
as "being released:' It returned a gross box office
of $46,495 on an initial investment (not including
Broderick's thousands) of $12.5 million. In practical terms, no one saw the movie. Nonetheless,
critics have called it a "masterpiece:' The New
Yorker termed the film "a cinematic wonder:'
From the very outset of Margaret, Kenneth
Lonergan probably attempted the impossible.
Our public cinemas are now the homes of special
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effects extravaganzas, the purview of super heroes
in the land of fantasy and science fiction. And
though that trend was already underway when
You Can Count on Me was released in 2000, it is
so far advanced today that enticing an audience to
sit still for over two and a half hours for a drama
about a self-centered high school junior, seems a
fantasy of a different kind and order. Whatever its
considerable artistic ambitions and merits, as an
act of commerce Margaret was probably dead on
arrival from the moment it was conceived. That's
the bad news-for Kenneth Lonergan, all his sup-

Kenneth Lonergan's scripts
continually shift the angle
from which he examines his
characters, and thus we see them
in an unusual wholeness, their
blemishes as well as their beauty.
porters, and cinephiles of a certain kind, like me.
The good news is that Margaret is now available
on DVD and can be appreciated on the home flat
screen the way we appreciate such superior television fare as The Wire, Treme, Mad Men, and
Homeland.
nneth Lonergan's storytelling is rich
nd challenging because he refuses to see
uman beings in black and white. His
scripts continually shift the angle from which he
examines his characters, and thus we see them in
an unusual wholeness, their blemishes as well as
their beauty. In You Can Count on Me, Samantha
Prescott (Linney) would seem the epitome of
small-town propriety. She is the chief loan officer at the Scottsville bank in upstate New York.
She owns her own home. And she provides the
energetic kind of loving concern for her eightyear-old son Rudy (Rory Culkin) that has turned
the nation's so-called "soccer moms" into a potent
political force. But maybe Samantha is not quite
the rock of stability and good sense she seems.

K
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And perhaps some of the other folks we meet in
this film are not quite what they seem either.
The story in You Can Count on Me largely
concerns Samantha's relationship with her brother
Terry (Mark Ruffalo). Samantha and Terry were
orphaned as young children when their parents
were killed in an auto accident. We do not know
exactly how they grew up, whether they were
placed with relatives, in a foster home, or in an
orphanage. We do know, however, that even as
adults in their late twenties or so, they remain
fiercely, if imperfectly, connected to each other;
their bond, no doubt in significant part, forged
from their shared suffering. That Samantha fiercely
cherishes her brother cannot be doubted. When
she gets the letter announcing that he is coming
for a visit, her face lights up with a rapturous glow,
and on the day of his arrival, she dresses up as if
she's going on a date. But how outwardly different
these siblings have become. Samantha is resolutely
middle class and responsible. She earns a good
income, and she lives modestly well. Terry, in
contrast, is a mess. He is an itinerant laborer with
undefined skills in the building trades. He would
appear to know a little carpentry and perhaps
some plumbing, but he has certainly never settled
down. Thoroughly alienated from the small-town
atmosphere in Scottsville where he and his sister
were born and where Samantha still lives, Terry
moves from place to place, never settling for long
anywhere. Perhaps foremost among her concerns
about Terry, Samantha worries constantly about
his whereabouts. He has been in Florida, and he
has been in Alaska, and, more problematic, he has
been in jail.
We have lots of reasons for questioning Terry's
judgment. When we first meet him, he is taking his
uncomfortable departure from a troubled young
woman named Sheila (Gaby Hoffmann). Sheila is
pregnant with Terry's child, and neither of them
possesses the money for an abortion. More painfully, Sheila appears far more attached to Terry
than he to her. Terry seems to have no desire to
hurt Sheila, but on the other hand he apparently
lacks the good sense to avoid getting seriously
involved with someone he does not love. Terry
visits Samantha for the express purpose of borrowing enough money to fund Sheila's abortion.

In a host of other ways, Terry continues to exhibit
throughout the picture a core quality of habitually
poor decision making. While staying with Sheila,
he forgets to fetch Rudy from school as requested
and leaves the child out in the rain. On another
occasion, Terry takes Rudy to a bar instead of putting him to bed. And at his most irresponsible,
Terry takes his nephew to see the boy's father
(Josh Lucas), a scruffy lout who denies his paternity to Rudy's face.
Just as we begin to
determine that You Can
Count on Me is a story of
diametrical personalities,
however, we begin to spy
the cracks in Samantha's
facade of respectability. In
a metaphor for her darker
nature, when authorities
show up to tell a thirteenyear-old Samantha about
her
parents'
accident,
the kids for whom she is
babysitting decide that she
has sneaked outside for a
smoke. Nonetheless, we
are stumped by her later
teenaged
involvement
with a man like Rudy Sr. The answer perhaps
lies in Terry's oblique reference to Samantha's
"wild side." After a time, we conclude that by
"wild;' Terry probably means "ill-considered:'
Nine years ago, surrendering to an attraction
that must surely have been fleeting, Samantha
allowed herself to become pregnant by Rudy Sr.
Today, Samantha goes to dinner with an old beau
(Jon Tenney) she has not dated in over a year and
nonetheless ends up in the man's bed before the
end of the evening. And then, in an almost inexplicable fit of carnal surrender, she plunges into
a clandestine affair with her boss Brian Everett
(Matthew Broderick), a man she does not even
like and one who does not even pretend he might
leave his pregnant wife Nancy (Nina Garbiras).
Samantha isn't even entirely faithful to the person she believes she loves unconditionally: Terry.
Samantha does care deeply about Terry, but
her concern often manifests itself in irritation

and scolding tirades. It's no wonder that he's so
morose around her.
In short, Samantha is neither as responsible nor
as reputable as we initially presume, and certainly
not as wise (Lonergan cleverly manipulates our
class prejudice for his own thematic ends). She justifies running personal errands on company time
because they inevitably involve child care issues.
She fails to keep her employers properly notified
when she has a family crisis. And in so doing she

exhibits far more in common with Terry than she
would ever admit. In the film's most artfully subtle
moment, Samantha coolly threatens Brian with a
sexual-discrimination lawsuit and flirts with the
idea of corporate insurrection. At the same time,
Terry is not quite the uncaring leech we at first
judge him. His actions are often unwise, and he is
completely, unreconstructably undisciplined. But
his heart is often in the right place. He does care
for his young nephew. Terry tries to teach Rudy
about carpentry, and he manipulates a barroom
pool game so that Rudy can sink the winning ball,
much to the child's pride and pleasure. Terry also
genuinely cares for his sister. He tells Rudy that the
boy's greatest luck is the goodness of his mother.
Terry even cares for Sheila in a way that wins him
at least partial redemption.
A significant theme in You Can Count on Me,
as in Margaret, is the extent to which adults continue to act like children. We even have a scene
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in which, like a child, Terry plays intently with
Rudy's Gameboy. Terry engages in a snit about
tattling with Rudy that recalls the argument of
youngsters in a schoolyard. Samantha's sexual
promiscuity, and Terry's as well, is like that of
adolescence. Consequences don't enter their consideration. Samantha's trysts with her boss Brian
initially even take place in his car, just like teenagers on a back-road lovers' lane.
Lonergan refuses to place blame on the
usual suspects. The people of Scottsville are not
the monsters and perverts who stand in every
small-town storefront created by someone like
David Lynch. The local sheriff (Adam LeFevre) is
a man of patience and concern. The local pastor
(Lonergan) is a man of considerable compassion
and reluctance to judge. In the end, Lonergan
avers the role of fate in our lives. The trajectories
of Samantha's and Terry's lives were no doubt
unalterably changed by the deaths of their parents.
Today, they have the virtue of genuinely loving
each other, but neither can change the nature of
the other. As a result, they will continue to disappoint each other for some time to come, maybe
forever. And that is the downbeat message in this
film's almost shockingly quiet conclusion. On the
other hand, in the magic of a thematic paradox,
their love endures. Terry goes away again, but
promises to stay in touch, promises to return. And
maybe he will. And born oflove, maybe he and his
sister will finally find a way to fulfill each other as
both of them do so desperately desire.
amantha and Terry Presscott obviously
stand for many of us as we try to wend our
way from youth to adulthood, but the canvas of You Can Count on Me is small, a brother
and a sister in a small town. Margaret is more
ambitious and explores more and broader themes,
not in a rural, isolated village but in New York,
one of the world's busiest and most crowded cities. Lonergan likes to establish visual metaphors
from the physical landscape surrounding his
characters. In You Can Count on Me, the director's
camera notices a graveyard as Terry's bus takes
him to visit his sister, establishing that the bond
that connects them was forged by their parents'
accidental deaths. And though we can extrapolate
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lessons for ourselves from the lives of Samantha
and Terry, Lonergan urges that kind of connection explicitly in Margaret with his repeated shots
of New York cityscapes: the crush of pedestrians
on daytime sidewalks, the endless lights of countless high-rises gleaming through the night, the
inevitable clot of traffic stretching to the urban
horizon. The characters he deals with in Margaret
are instructive, but representative. There is a narrative for everyone we pass on a crowded street,
for everyone tapping fingers in a car waiting for
the light to change, for everyone in every office
and apartment from which silver light spills into
the night-darkened sky.
Like You Can Count on Me, the story in
Margaret is propelled by an accident. High-school
junior, Lisa Cohen (Anna Paquin) runs along a
daytime Manhattan street, flirting with bus driver
Gerald Maretti (Mark Ruffalo) at the wheel of his
Transit Authority bus. Distracted, Gerald runs
a red light and drives over middle-aged pedestrian Monica Patterson (Allison Janney), tearing
her body to pieces and leaving her only minutes
to live. Lisa doesn't know Monica, but she rushes
to hold her while they wait for an ambulance that
arrives only after Monica has bled to death in
Lisa's arms. When the police arrive, Gerald and
Lisa exchange furtive glances and then tell the
same story: the bus went through the intersection
on green; Monica walked against the light.
But, her conscience stricken, Lisa first tells the
true story to her mother, Broadway actress, Joan
Cohen (J. Smith Cameron), who observes that
perhaps Lisa should think of the bus driver and
his family before returning to the police to correct
her story. Monica's death was still an accident,
and acknowledging that the driver was distracted
will not bring the victim back to life. Particularly
in retrospect, this is good advice. But Lisa refuses
to take it. She changes her police report, but the
police say that even if Gerald was distracted as
a result of her flirting, Monica's death was still
an accident and no grounds exist for charges.
Enraged, Lisa makes contact first with Monica's
cousin Abigail (Betsy Aidem) and subsequently
Monica's best friend Emily (Jeannie Berlin). In
the latter, Lisa finds a kindred angry soul, and
together Emily and Lisa devise a plan to bring a

wrongful death suit against Gerald, a court action
they hope will get him fired. Complications
ensue. Emily and Lisa have no standing to sue,
so they do so in Abigail's name. But once Abigail
is involved, it is clear that she will gladly take
whatever money can be extracted but cares little
about anything else in the matter. She and Monica
weren't even on friendly terms. And, of course,
Gerald hasn't any money, so the suit ends up
against his employer, the Transit Authority. One
wouldn't expect much good to come out of any of
this, and none does.
Along the way, however, we are confronted
with a series of characters,
very few of whom elicit
much in the way of our
sympathy. Lisa's divorced
father Karl (Lonergan)
lives in California and
stays in occasional contact with his daughter by
telephone, but his selfabsorption is so noxious
we can almost smell it.
When Lisa tells him about
her bad conscience, his
first reaction is to invoke
the advice of a lawyer to
protect Lisa and himself
from a prospective, and never threatened, lawsuit.
Joan is somewhat better. We do believe that her
caring for her daughter is real, but Joan is also so
self-absorbed that when she meets Emily, rather
than talking about Monica, Joan rambles on about
her own career and how nice it is to enjoy the
occasional success and attract critical praise in
the reviews. Emily is an emotional monster. Her
grief has turned into such fury that she simply
wants to hurt someone. She isn't ever particularly nice to Lisa, even though Lisa provides her
the weapon with which to wield her anger. She is
flat and pointlessly rude to Dave (Michael Ealy),
the lawyer friend who tries to help her. She creates a horrible public scene when confronted with
an insensitive remark by Joan's boyfriend Ramon
(Jean Reno). And ultimately Emily turns her
wrath on Lisa, accusing the teenager of "caring

too easily;' and upbraiding Lisa that "You're not
the one this is happening to:' That we agree with
both of these observations in no way lessens the
cruelty with which they are delivered.
But if an array of the characters are unsympathetic, Lisa stands foremost among them. She
is a bright girl, and, except in math, a good student. But she is also frighteningly immature and
needlessly mean. She bullies her younger brother,
simply because he is too little to stop her. When
Darren (John Gallagher), the socially shy boy
who tutors her in math, asks her to the movies,

An,.lll!l,quin in Margaret.
Pictures, 2011 .

like a cat toying with a trapped mouse, she tries
to tie him in knots over whether the invitation is a
"date:' She relates to her imperfect mother with a
series of sneers, sarcastic remarks, and outbursts,
and when her mother stands up to her, she threatens to move to California to live with her father.
When Lisa is with the police, she is needlessly
combative even before she is denied her desire
that Gerald be arrested, and afterward she accuses
the detectives, outside of all context, of being racists. Outside of school, to his face, she ridicules
her English teacher (Broderick), even though he is
trying to look out for her, and she snidely asks her
math teacher, Mr. Aaron (Matt Damon), if being
a high-school geometry teacher is "the summit of
his ambition:' When Mr. Aaron is uncomfortable
around her, she sniffs that he's "acting just like a
little kid:'
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Along with an ingrained nastiness, this last
jibe is an example of another of Lonergan's themes:
hypocrisy. Lisa repeatedly acts like a spoiled child,
yet accuses others of this characteristic. When
Emily attacks her, Lisa complains, "I don't understand why if I do something wrong, you can't
just give me a break:' But, of course, her crusade
against Gerald is a prime example of her doing
the same thing. Even the few "good" characters
suffer from hypocrisy. Joan's boyfriend Ramon, a
Panamanian who has made a fortune in Paris and
used his wealth to build orphanages in his home
country, is nonetheless capable of dismissing a
pro-Israeli argument (he's pro-Palestinian) as a
"typical Jewish response:' He would recoil at being
disregarded in that manner but cannot bring himself to understand that he has been offensive.
And as in You Can Count on Me, Lonergan
once again has things to say about careless sexual behavior. Joan and Ramon move from mere
acquaintances to bedmates perhaps too soon, certainly before Joan is sure that Ramon is the man
with whom she wants to spend the rest of her life.
But again, Lisa is our chief offender. When we first
see her with Mr. Aaron in her math classroom,
Lisa is wearing a skirt so short it barely covers
her panties, if she's wearing panties. Yet, as she is
discussing his concern that she used unauthorized assistance on a take-home geometry test, she
sits in front of him, and akin to Sharon Stone in
Basic Instinct, ostentatiously crosses her legs in a
way that flashes him. Because Mr. Aaron does not
respond, we don't know if he's looking at her at
that moment or, for certain, even if she has done
this on purpose, but in her dress and physical
movements she will win no trophies for appropriate modesty. She is a virgin, however, or at least
believably claims to be. For after making out with
Darren at a party and heartlessly telling him that
she loves him, she calls another boy from her
school, the drug dealing Paul (Kieran Culkin) and
asks him to deflower her. That their night of sex
together seems to reveal her almost utter lack of
experience and confidence might otherwise elicit
our sympathy, had her behavior not already turned
us so stubbornly against her. And what sympathy
she does command on her night with Paul is soon
squandered when she goes to Mr. Aaron's house
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and aggressively seduces him. The teacher flunks
adulthood for surrender to a teenager, but as Lisa
admits, the idea, overture, and determination all
came from her.
Also akin to You Can Count on Me, Margaret
worries about the stubborn childishness that
we cling to. This is related to the theme of selfabsorption discussed above, for any parent knows
the ways a child can see things from his or her perspective alone. It is, thus, no accident that two of
Joan's party tricks are to sing in the voice of the
four-year-old Shirley Temple and to cry like a baby
awakening for a nighttime feeding. Like Samantha
in You Can Count on Me, when Joan is frustrated,
she is prone to smash things around her house, to
sweep a dinner's worth of plates crashing to the
floor. Mr. Aaron is childish in surrendering to his
student. Ramon is childish by resorting to contempt rather than rational discussion. Even the
English teacher is childish for a moment when
he cannot dissuade a student from repeating the
same, wrongheaded, extra-textual point in a discussion about Shakespeare. Elsewhere, Lonergan
drives home this concern about childishness when
he has the English teacher read Gerard Manley
Hopkins's poem, "Spring and Fall, to a Young
Child;' in which the poet counsels a girl named
Margaret (hence the movie's title) who is worried
about the coming of autumn and ends with the
couplet "It is the blight that man was born for/ It is
Margaret you mourn for:' In short, ours is a youthobsessed culture, and we do ourselves no favors by
refusing to grow up.
And there is more. Working from a script
begun in the months after the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there are
heated discussions about Islamic terrorism and
the reasons that America is hated by so many in
the Muslim world. And lest we forget an underlying cause of all that, in his shots of the physical
environment, Lonergan's camera sometimes spies
gigantic oil tankers easing into the ports of New
York harbor.
In sum, though I am a fan of Kenneth Lonergan
and an admirer of this movie, I can understand
why he had such a difficult time producing the
final cut that was his obligation and prerogative.
First, I think he was too devoted to all those shots

of Manhattan streets, buildings, waterways, and
anonymous people. They interrupt the action
repeatedly to diminishing effect once we realize the point he is making. And, in every case, he
lingers on them longer than necessary. They slow
things down in a way that doesn't serve the movie.
The more extensive problem, though, stems from
Lonergan's early decision to make so many of his
characters so deeply dislikable. Margaret's lineup
of characters includes few saving graces. We may
recognize that Emily is suffering over the loss of
her dear friend, but she doesn't have to be so ugly
to everyone and so superior in her ugliness to boot.
We may realize that Mr. Aaron is the pursued, not
the pursuer, but it is his obligation to resist the
very kind of temptation he surrenders to. We may
realize that Ramon is a decent man, but that is no
defense against his anti-Semitism. We may realize
that Joan lacks self-confidence and is involved in
a career that fans the flames of her insecurity, but
that doesn't excuse her lack of maternal strength.
We may recognize that Gerald's momentary irresponsibility merits forgiveness, but that doesn't
forgive his lying, his refusal to accept responsibility, and his knee-jerk hostility toward Lisa. And
we may recognize that Lisa's instinctual effort to
comfort the dying Monica and her subsequent
pangs of conscience about her role in the accident
may indicate that someday she may indeed grow
up, but until the very closing scene we see no solid
evidence that Lisa has honored her pledge not to
turn Monica's horrible, tragic death into her "own

personal moral gymnasium:' I can't help but wonder if Lonergan didn't stymie himself in his desire
to save characters that his audience would find so
distasteful.
Still, there is not a sliver of doubt that save
them he intended. And that is why we get the
film's closing scene, mother and daughter, emotionally broken, holding on to each other for dear
life. In the complex structure of Margaret's story,
brilliance lies; in its insistent conclusion, wisdom
blooms. That we will sin is a given of our human
nature. That we can be redeemed is the grace
offered by the divine and the possibility that we
must all extend to one another. t
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Brain Memoirs
Thinking About Thinking
Harold K. Bush

J

UST OVER FORTY YEARS AGO, HAL LINDSEY

published his harrowing account of the apocalypse, The Late, Great Planet Earth. One of
Lindsey's key texts for prophesying the end of the
world was Daniel 12:4, which describes a time
when "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge
shall be increased:' Little did he know, in the early
1970s, how prescient those words would become
for to day's "millennials" in the light of the Internet's
climb to cultural dominance. To and fro, indeed.
Given our peripatetic tendencies, some educators are becoming alarmist. Recently, it has come
to our attention that we may be facing a readerly
apocalypse, that our brains are being radically
rewired, and that the mark of the beast may very
well be our IP addresses. The reading habits of the
young, including university students, are of particular concern, given that they have never known
a time when the beast has not been in full control.
The dire challenges presented to them by the onset
of the Internet revolution are becoming regular
headline grabbers in books, magazines, and on the
web itself.
Thus, while Hal Lindsey has all but vanished
from cultural relevance, a new kind of doomsday
prophet is emerging. Some observers have even
returned to that obscure verse in Daniel, and the
explosive growth of the Internet is usually considered to be the key culprit (along with its ancillary
accomplice, smartphones, which like God seem
omniscient, omnipresent, and wired to the heavens
24/7). The Internet's mind-blowing content fosters a disruptive "to-and-fro-ness" within our fitful
imaginations, as we surf around the vast ocean of
data, never settled for very long on any one site.
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It promotes, in Nicholas Carr's famous formulation, a "shallow" encounter with both print and
digital texts (The Shallows, 2010). Carr wonders
if the Internet is doing more than making us stupid: he asks us to face the possibility that computer
technology (the most powerfully transformative
medium in world history) has become obsessive
for many Westerners. To state it in the booming
popular term, the Internet has an uncanny ability
to foster neuroplasticity. It also seems to be undermining authority by breeding uncritical acceptance
of virtually any opinion. My students nowadays cite
with unqualified confidence just about anything
they find online in their "research" papers. They are
evidently unable to make useful distinctions or discriminations about the trustworthiness of one site
over another.
Debatable as Carr's conclusions may be, what
I like most about his bestseller is the introductory
material about his own personal changes in reading and thinking. Carr is very good at drawing in
older readers (like me) by narrating the changes
that he has begun to notice more and more (as I
have noticed them, and perhaps as you have). The
motif that seems most prominent in Carr's account
is "distraction:' We troll the shallows because our
brains have literally been rewired to fixate on
an everlasting search for more, and better, and
fresher, input. We have a hard time concentrating, says Carr, and that restlessness is becoming
a hard-wired feature of our physical brains, a feature that, in Carr's view, is contributing to human
stupidity. His most sinister culprit is Google, for
its unwieldy stake in our growing obtuseness, as
famously stated in the title of his cover-essay in

The Atlantic ("Is Google Making Us Stupid?" July/
August 2008).
Carr's tale is part of a growing trend in some
sectors of the publishing world right now, a genre
I would like to call "brain memoirs:' These are the
autobiographical musings of brains in transition,
thoughtful accounts of the plasticity of one's brain.
Brain memoirs can take several forms, such as that
of the quirky book called Losing It, by William Ian
Miller (2011), much of which describes how aging
affects our reading habits and memories (Losing It
also might scare the hell out of anyone over fifty).
Miller's book is a metacognitive study of a brain
looking at itself through the lens of aging and classical literature. Another example is Alan Jacobs's
The Pleasures of Reading in an Age of Distraction
(2011), a beautifully written account of reading by a
lifelong reader who frets over his changing readerly
habits. Jacobs hits notes of mild despair and warns
us against the monster of electronic media (even
as he learns to like his shiny new Kindle). And like
Carr, Jacobs is extremely articulate about the titular
topic of "distraction:'
Perhaps most influential in academic circles is Jaron Lanier's quirky yet, at times, moving
manifesto of 2010, the title of which prophetically
captures the author's angst: You Are Not a Gadget.
Lanier's emotional plea for human dignity is reminiscent of the great scene in the film Network
(1976), with countless disturbed Americans leaning out their windows to yell to the winds, "''m as
mad as Hell and I'm not going to take it anymore!"
Lanier's jeremiad about the penetration of the
digital into almost every area of our lives is additionally provocative given his own legendary status
as famed programmer and innovator of such concepts as "virtual reality;' a phrase he is said to have
coined, and the use of "avatars" as graphic depictions of users online. Since he is widely considered
one of the chief architects of the Internet as we now
encounter it every day, Lanier's resounding critique
of its dehumanizing and anti-intellectual effects is
trenchant and highly informed.
These and other forceful volumes are taking
advantage of the wave of popular neuroscience
that has emerged recently. Thanks in large part to
the extremely sophisticated machinery available to
research scientists today, in tandem with the highly

creative experiments that psychiatrists and neuroscientists come up with for using those machines, we
have learned more in the last twenty years about the
way the brain works and which areas do what types
of thinking than in all of human history before. This
publishing boom began with the extremely successful works of Malcolm Gladwell, especially his
wonderfully-titled and well-written volume Blink
(2007), which has set the bar for sales and slickness,
and has become the popular primer on the brain's
plasticity (its ability to reform itself and establish
new connections). Gladwell illustrates the brain's

We have learned more in the last
twenty years about the way the
brain works and which areas do
what types of thinking than in all
of human history before.

ability to "thin-slice" reality: to "know" something
in the twinkling of an eye, thus the title Blink. And
Gladwell has famously exploited the flourishing
neuroscience of the past two decades, sometimes
to much critical scorn for his non sequiturs and
overgeneralizations. (More nuanced and motivated
readers might go on to Norman Doidge's influential
2007 volume, The Brain that Changes Itself) Despite
the book's flaws of methodology and logic, Blink is
compelling reading (as are his other volumes, especially The Tipping Point [2007] and Outliers [2011]),
and Gladwell remains the pop-guru of this emerging field.
Combining vast scientific data with the popular,
narrative-driven exposition perfected by Gladwell,
many other interesting books have appeared recently
in this emerging genre. Two of the most popular of
2012 have been Imagine: How Creativity Works by
Jonah Lehrer and The Power of Habit: Why We Do
What We Do in Life and Business by Charles Duhigg.
Both are filled with intriguing stories and personalities, and both are good at introducing (some of) the
scientific data to general readers. In all, the books
Advent/Christmas 2012
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mentioned here so far, along with numerous others (many of which are often featured prominently
on the front shelves at Barnes and Noble) comprise
a growing and influential subfield in popular nonfiction. We should also remember that this genre
of pop-scholarship hardly existed as recently as ten
years ago. Thus, it seems that such "brain memoirs"
and related studies of the brain "thinking about
thinking" are here to stay.

How are we to remain as "wise
as serpents, and as innocent as
doves" in light of the growing
body of literature about
our brains and our lifelong
stewardship of them?

d yet, hardly anyone has thought much
r written about the implications of these
aterials for the study and practice of
spirituality. For readers of this journal, that perspective would feature most prominently Christian
beliefs and disciplines. And so I want to conclude
by asking: What is the upshot of these findings for
us as Christians? How are we to remain as "wise as
serpents, and as innocent as doves" in light of the
growing body of literature about our brains and our
lifelong stewardship of them? And how might we
augment a pious and robust spiritual practice with
the help of the findings of current brain science?
A full and satisfying set of responses to these
challenging questions is well beyond the scope of
this essay. It would be a great book to write, one day.
But for now, I would like to speak personally about
how some of these insights have had an effect on
my own thinking. As such, perhaps this is one more
attempt-on a very small scale-of writing a brief
version of a brain memoir-in this case, my own.
One very intriguing insight that is becoming
clear in contemporary neuroscience is that we have
the ability to "program;' or manipulate for good,
our own brains, a technique that can allow us to find
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increasing happiness in repetitive, habitual activities. The more we do something regularly, the more
joyful and peaceful the activity becomes. In other
words, through habits and exercise and discipline,
even hard work like scholarship, or weightlifting,
can become satisfying and foster happiness. Habits
of discipline and practice eventually bring us more
and more joy, and this seems likely for just about
anything we do habitually-both good habits and
bad habits, so beware. What at first seems like
boring and repetitive work-practicing piano, gardening, walking the dogs-can end up becoming
an almost addictive behavior that we feel compelled
to do every day.
To say it another way: If we do something
mindfully, over and over, with patience and close
observation, there is great joy to be found there.
One intriguing book that documents this is titled
simply, Thanks! How the New Science of Gratitude
Can Make You Happier (2007). Thanks! was written
by Robert Emmons, editor of a prominent psychology journal. The upshot here is that thankfulness
is largely a learned behavior. The more we practice being thankful, the more thankful we become,
intuitively. If we telescope this out to all of the virtues, or the "fruits of the spirit" (Galatians 5), we
might think about how fruitful attitudes like love,
joy, peace, and patience are also things we can practice, improve at, and allow to become instinctive.
Just like free throws in basketball, or difficult bar
chords like F on a guitar, they become internalized.
These may be obvious pointers regarding
how our brains work and reconnect in productive
ways, but I also think we must beware that we do
not become "shallow" readers or shallow followers of God. We need to keep working at the deep
things, pushing ourselves to read the deep books,
focusing on the deep conversations. All of these
activities are under siege in our 24/7 digital world,
and I hope this will not sound too dire or too pretty.
But yes, I am concerned: perhaps not so concerned
as Nicholas Carr (let alone Hal Lindsey), but seriously wondering how I can mindfully practice a
kind of distance from the more sinister influences
of the Internet and other technologies. To be blunt:
I worry about how my own brain is changing, in
many ways negatively, as it has been shaped by digital technologies. It is harder to read for long periods

of time; I'm much more easily distracted; and in
short I often find myself longing for "connection;'
hoping for that certain email (usually disappointed,
by the way), or just surfing around and seeing what
is new in the world. But even as my MacBook boots
up, I recall a wistful observation from Marilynne
Robinson: "I miss civilization, and I want it back:'
And so, in that spirit, I would like to end with
a very brief list of ideas about how to balance our
digital lives.
•

Digital fasting: I try to turn off the computer
from about midday Saturday through Monday
morning. And yet it is hard; very hard. I do
not always make it.

•

Reading out loud long passages, including
whole chapters from the Bible: we are doing
this weekly in a study group I lead. Americans
have almost forgotten how to listen to heightened speech.

•

Refusing the tyranny of the urgent that
is rampant among my students and their
occasionally annoying or insulting emails: I
encourage face-to-face encounters that seem
to me more humane than code on a screen.

•

Often leaving behind my cellphone: especially
on walks or hikes, but also at the bookstore or
other shopping venues, at films or concerts,
parties or dinners, or other events. Certainly
church (every week several cellphones ring in
the sermon; I guess I just don't hear them during the worship). Frankly, I am astonished by
the number of lit-up screens that dot darkened
theaters these days, and I often have to ask
other audience members to please shut it off.

•

Download articles and print them out to read:
too much staring into screens already.

•

Silence. As much and as long as possible,
in a host of different manners and settings
throughout my week.

I am sure there are many other practices that the
spiritually-inclined have devised to wrestle against

the imposing forces of the Internet in our lives. And
honestly I would love to hear about them: please
send me an email and tell me about them. But in
closing, it strikes me that I do not wish to come
across holier than thou in any of this. I am struggling with it all too. Like the authors mentioned
above, I am becoming ever more alert to the ways
my brain seems to have changed from younger days.
Part of it is surely simple aging. But part of it is all
this electronic noise and the concomitant "shallow"
encounters with the newest, the flashiest. Probably
if you have read this far, you are wrestling too.
So let us just say it this way: We all need to be
mindful, as stewards of those wonderful organs we
call brains, of how we form them through habitlest we be drawn even further into the maw of the
beast (is that too apocalyptic?). The good news is
that we can do it; neuroscience now supports a view
that there are specific, habitual acts of moral agency
humans can deploy in the interests of their brains.
It is ennobling to discover that we can in large part
co-create the kind of brain we would like to have,
and that it is up to each of us to nurture and cultivate
our brains from today and through the balance of
our earthly lives. All of this, however, does require
work, and echoing most of the authors above, perhaps that is the key message I would like to impress
upon this generation of frenetic, millennia! college
students-and myself. But after all, maybe it is not
all so fresh. Henry David Thoreau wrote similarly
over 160 years ago: "As a single footstep will not
make a path on the earth, so a single thought will
not make a pathway in the mind. To make a deep
physical path, we walk again and again. To make a
deep mental path, we must think over and over the
kind of thoughts we wish to dominate our lives:'
And so I ask you, dear reader: what sorts of
thoughts do you wish to dominate your life? 'f

Harold K. Bush, author of Lincoln in His
Own Time (2011) and Mark Twain and the
Spiritual Crisis of His Age (2007}, is Professor
of English at Saint Louis University. His email
address is bushhk@slu.edu , and he welcomes your comments (and confessions) on
t his art icle.
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DESIRE
It arrives on your doorstep
swaddled like an orphan.
You glance around, check
the mailbox for a note. Nothing.
You feed it. It grows, begins
to walk, helps itself
to the olives in the fridge,
sucking out the pimentos
and spitting them on the counter.
Before long, it's lounging
in its underwear, scratching itself,
telling you, I'm hungry,
make me a sandwich.
Tuna, no crust.

Or you starve it,
shut it in a coat closet
for weeks under a heap
of forgotten shoes, turn the TV up
till its crying stops and you kill
the noise, soak in the silence,
believe things are back
the way they were.
But when everything's still
and you lie awake in bed,
it whooshes about the house
singing your name
in the thin, bright tones
of a castrato.

1:

)1

Brent Newsom
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The Knight of Faith an d The Dark Knight
Ross Moret

A

T FIRST GLANCE, AND PERHAPS EVEN AT

second and third glances, it may seem
strange to place the names of S0ren
Kierkegaard and Bruce Wayne in the same sentence. However, Christopher Nolan's recent
trilogy of Batman films-Batman Begins (2005),
The Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight
Rises (2012)-explore many of the same themes
as the work of the Danish, existentialist philosopher. Nolan's hero confronts fear, dread, loss, and
isolation, human experiences that are among
Kierkegaard's deepest concerns. And, despite the
darkness, both Nolan and Kierkegaard end up
telling uplifting stories in which the possibility
of redemption is always present, even amidst the
worst difficulties. Bruce Wayne achieves a kind
of redemption, or what Kierkegaard would call
repetition, as he proceeds through a long and
difficult journey marked by despair, faith, and
sacrifice.
Very little imagination is required to make
a superficial comparison between the characters of Job, the biblical subject of Kierkegaard's
Repetition, and Bruce Wayne. Both are wealthy
individuals forced to undergo ordeals at the
hands of demonic figures. Satan strips Job of his
family, his wealth, and his health. His friends
and his wife come to offer criticism, even blaming him for his troubles. In the end, Job receives
everything back two-fold. Similarly, Wayne's parents are murdered by Joe Chill, his mansion is
burnt to the ground by Ra's al Ghul, his great love
and oldest friend is slaughtered by the Joker, his
fortune is stripped by Talia al Ghul, and his body
is broken by Bane. His faithful butler, Alfred,
tries to convince him to give up on Batman while
Selina Kyle looks to persuade him to abandon
Gotham. In the end, Bruce also receives everything back two-fold, but his returns are spiritual

rather than material. In Kierkegaard's terminology, Bruce Wayne achieves a repetition.
What is repetition for Kierkegaard, and
how is it achieved? Constantin Constantius, the
pseudonym under which Kierkegaard published
Repetition, compares it with the concept of recollection. Recollection and repetition, he says, "are
the same movement, except in opposite directions"
(131). The concept of recollection is drawn from
Greek metaphysics. It refers to our ability through
physical experiences of the material world and
intellectual effort to recall the eternal, ideal forms
that provide a source of meaning to all reality.
Recollection is a process of remembering; repetition, in contrast, is the active practice of becoming.
Repetition is a future-oriented effort that entails
resolutely trusting God, despite our experiences
with losses in the past and uncertainties of what is
to come. Through repetition, we seek the wholeness of eternity not in memories of the past, but
in ethical action that offers hope for restoration
of ourselves and the world. (On this complicated
and elusive notion in Kierkegaard's thought, see
Mooney 1998; also Jackson 1999,49 n 44.)
A repetition of this kind occurs when Batman
saves Police Commissioner Gordon's son from the
deranged Harvey Dent near the end of The Dark
Knight. In the scene, Dent holds a gun to Gordon's
son and forces Gordon to reassure the child with
the words, "It's going to be alright, son:' Dent does
not realize, of course, that these words were twice
spoken to a young Bruce Wayne in a similar situation: first by his dying father and second by a kind
police sergeant, none other than Jim Gordon.
Bruce heard these words as a helpless young boy,
and he spent seven years training so that the next
time he heard them he would be able to do something about the situation; he saves Gordon's son in
a repetition.
Advent/Christmas 2012
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For Kierkegaard, however, repetition is both an
ethical and a religious phenomenon. While Job, the
biblical subject of Repetition, would not have experienced a repetition if he had not acted in a way that
was pleasing to God, ultimately it was God who saw
to it that Job received everything back twice-over.
For true repetition then, human action is required
but is not sufficient; faith is required as well.

deemed Gotham City so corrupt that it warranted
complete destruction. In a scene from Batman
Begins that conjures up images of Abraham bartering with God over Sodom and Gomorrah,
Wayne begs Ra's Al Ghul for more time to turn
Gotham around and cries out that "there are good
people here:' In a scene in The Dark Knight, Wayne
demonstrates faith in the people of Gotham when

Nolan's
version
of
Gotham
City
de-emphasizes the most fantastic elements of
Batman's comic books, opting to portray a city
that seems very much like one to which we might
pay a visit. Likewise, while Nolan incorporates
philosophical and religious themes into his films,
they tend to be existential rather than transcendent in tone.
It might not surprise us, then, to find that
Bruce Wayne's faith is not in God, but in something much more mundane: Gotham City. Or,
perhaps to be more precise, Wayne places his faith
in the goodness of the people of Gotham City.
Two scenes are sufficient to illustrate the point.
The first demonstrates a chief difference between
Bruce Wayne and the vigilantes of the League
of Shadows, the leader of which, Ra's Al Ghul,

the Joker manipulates hostages in an attempt to
demonstrate the superficiality of "society's rules:'
The Joker plants explosives on two ferries that are
attempting to leave the city. One ferry is filled with
convicts, and the other with average citizens. The
passengers on each ferry are provided with a trigger to detonate the other boat and told that in a
few minutes both ferries will explode unless one
ferry destroys the other. When Gordon is notified of the situation he tells Batman in desperation
that "every second we take, those people on the
ferries get closer to blowing each other up:' But
Wayne, as Batman, steadfastly replies, "That won't
happen!" For Wayne, for Job, and as we shall see
for Abraham, no amount of personal effort or
integrity can bring about a repetition. Getting
back what has been lost can only occur by virtue
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of the object of faith, which Kierkegaard dubs "the
absurd" in perhaps his most famous work, Fear
and Trembling.
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, speaks primarily of
two kinds of figures, the knight of faith, exemplified by Abraham, who, in Genesis 22, was
commanded to sacrifice his son Isaac, and the
knight of infinite resignation, a subset of which
is the tragic hero. "The difference between the
tragic hero and Abraham;' de Silentio writes, "is
very obvious. The tragic hero is still within the
ethical;' the universal social rules by which we
live our lives among others (Fear and Trembling,
59). For the tragic hero, to go beyond that which
everyone, everywhere and at all times, should do
is a transgression. For the knight of faith though,
the particular situation becomes higher than the
universal rules by means of paradoxical faith. It is
only by means of a direct and individual relation
to God through faith, which de Silentio argues
leads to "the teleological suspension of the ethical;' that Abraham can be saved. According to the
universal, Abraham is a murderer; according to
the paradox, he is the father of faith.
But such faith has further ramifications. Both
the knight of faith and the knight of infinite resignation fortify themselves against the changes
of the finite world by relating to that which is
infinite: the tragic hero to the universal and the
knight of faith to the object of faith. Were a tragic
hero given the command given to Abraham, he
would have carried out the sacrifice but would
have given up all hope upon beginning to climb
the mountain. Abraham, though, never gave up
hope. He was ready to sacrifice Isaac, but he was
also ready to receive him back with joy. Whereas
the knight of infinite resignation gives up the
world, the knight of faith receives the world back
again by virtue of belief in the absurd.
Images of Abrahamic sacrifice are something of
a motif in Nolan's Batman films. In Batman Begins,
Bruce Wayne lays in wait to shoot his parents' murderer in front of a huge crowd in broad daylight,
but just as he is about to pull the trigger a mob goon
shoots the man instead. In The Dark Knight, the
Joker threatens to commit a murder every day that
Batman's identity remains a secret; however, just as

Wayne steps forward to take responsibility, Harvey
Dent declares himself to be the Batman.
Perhaps the most interesting such scene,
and the most relevant, occurs at the climax of
The Dark Knight, when Batman chooses to take
the guilt of Dent's (now Two-Face) crimes upon
himself. This scene recalls the opening pages
of Fear and Trembling, where de Silentio offers
four imaginative renditions of how the sacrifice
of Isaac might have played out were Abraham a
knight of infinite resignation rather than a knight
of faith. The first rendering is worthy of quotation
at length:
Abraham climbed Mount Moriah, but
Isaac did not understand him. Then
Abraham turned away from him for a
moment, but when Isaac saw Abraham's
face again, it had changed: his gaze was
wild, his whole being was sheer terror.
He seized Isaac by the chest, threw him to
the ground, and said, "Stupid boy, do you
think I am your father? I am an idolater.
Do you think it is God's command? No
it is my desire:' Then Isaac trembled and
cried out in his anguish: "God in heaven,
have mercy on me, God of Abraham, have
mercy on me; if I have no father on earth,
then you be my father!" But Abraham said
softly to himself, "Lord God in heaven, I
thank you; it is better that he believes me
a monster than that he should lose faith
in you:' ( 11)
The similarities between the film's climax and
de Silentio's first imaginative construction of the
Genesis 22 sacrifice are striking. Here Batman
is like the ram in the thicket. Wayne functions
as Abraham. Dent has shifted from his role as
the ram to become a god-character, a symbol
of the goodness of Gotham. And the people of
Gotham City have entered the picture in the role
of Isaac, those whose faith must be maintained
through deception. Gordon declares that when
the people learn of Dent's fall to madness they,
"will lose hope:' Batman decides to deceive them
in order to maintain their faith. "Because sometimes the truth isn't good enough. Sometimes
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people deserve more. Sometimes people deserve
to have their faith rewarded:' Batman seems to
operate under his own faith-inspired teleological
suspension of the ethical. He transgresses the rule
of law, to which everyone everywhere is subject
and according to which he is a criminal, worthy
of life in prison. Batman, however, is not interested in following the rules: he is interested in the
redemption of Gotham. "I can do those things;'
he tells Gordon, "because I'm not a hero-not like
Dent. I am whatever Gotham needs me to be:'

Batman's death provides a
similar dramatic example, and
his faith in the goodness of the
city is rewarded. He resigns
everything; however, this time
he grasps everything as well. His
repetition is complete.

But if Batman somehow believes that he
operates beyond the ethical, Bruce Wayne suffers
mightily from having made this sacrifice. While
his actions follow those of de Silentio's first imaginative construction, the fallout is closer to the
second rendition: "From that day henceforth,
Abraham was old; he could not forget that God
had ordered him to do this. Isaac flourished as
before, but Abraham's eyes were darkened and
he saw joy no more" (12). Indeed, while Gotham
seems to have improved, this is how we find Bruce
Wayne in the opening scenes of the third film, The
Dark Knight Rises-aged beyond his years, unable
to move beyond the death of his beloved Rachel,
and haunted by the deception regarding Harvey
Dent. The word that Kierkegaard might use for
Wayne's mindset at this point is despair, which
the pseudonym Anti-Climacus describes in The
Sickness Unto Death as the desire "to want to be
rid of oneself" (147). Alastair Hannay helpfully
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glosses this explanation by writing that despair,
for Anti-Climacus, is "a response to whatever it is
about one's 'self' that makes one unhappy being
it, its particular defects, its contingent historical
situation, the human condition as such, or certain demands implicit in the notion of selfhood"
(1997, 332).
It is clear to those around him that Bruce
Wayne wants to be rid of himself. Alfred, Wayne's
butler and oldest friend, fears not that Wayne
will fail if he returns as Batman, but that Wayne's
despair has finally reached suicidal proportions.
And Bane, the villain of the film and a leader in
the rejuvenated League of Shadows, even refuses
to kill Wayne because, as he says to Wayne, "You
do not fear death, you welcome it:' But this
moment is the beginning of Wayne's ultimate
repetition. Bane puts Wayne in a prison designed
to maximize despair by providing a glimmer
of hope-the prison has no ceiling. Wayne has
fallen in such a hole before but was taught by his
father the meaning of such setbacks. "Why do we
fall;' his father asked. "So we can learn to pick
ourselves up." And Wayne experienced despair
once before, when he languished for years after
the death of his parents before attempting to
be rid of himself by killing their murderer in
front of a large crowd. He found faith and purpose, however, like his father, in working for the
redemption of Gotham. Ultimately he became
the Batman. Now he must become the Batman
once again, but before he can do that he must
climb out of this prison. He tries twice, crashing against the wall as a rope saves him from
perishing. Then, on the third attempt, he does
something absurd; he makes the climb without a
rope and, in the most strikingly Kierkegaardian
of images, makes a great leap to freedom. It is also
a leap to faith. He resolves to trust the cat burglar Selina Kyle even after she betrayed him. And
when he is forced to sacrifice the Batman once
again, and this time Bruce Wayne with him, all is
not lost but gained. His parents' deaths, which we
are told in Batman Begins shocked the city into
saving itself, ultimately drove Wayne to become
the Batman. Batman's death provides a similar
dramatic example, and his faith in the goodness
of the city is rewarded. He resigns everything;

however, this time he grasps everything as well.
His repetition is complete.
A reading of this kind begs the question, were
these themes intentionally incorporated into the
films? Ultimately, the question is both unanswerable and largely immaterial, for the mere fact that
we can discuss themes such as these in this manner of detail demonstrates that these films provide
a level of sophistication and a depth of vision
worth talking and thinking about. And that, after
all, is the genius of both Kierkegaard and of the
biblical stories of Abraham and Job upon which
he meditates; they draw us to struggle with great
questions and to search out the inadequacy of our
easy, pat answers. Those of us with religious sensibilities might chaff at the reduction of faith to
finite and fallible humanity, and in my mind we
are right to do so. But perhaps then we are asking
more of The Dark Knight than he can provide.
We still need those old Knights of Faith after all. ,_

Philosophy at Florida State University.
The author expresses his thanks to Sophie
Lenarz-Coy Moret and John Moret for their
helpful comments on this essay.
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SATURDAY: ANIMATED CHERRY
Sometimes the dream gets muddled:
one night, it's barn swallows; another,
a gold rooster that flares up from double
crust when the first cooled piece gets cut.
Always, you're amazed that feathers come
out clean, survive the oven's fire: Abednegos
with wings. And it's your hands covered
in canned cherry filling. Right before
waking, it turns to red syrup-or blood
dried from that day's slaughter-or the
notyetbaby lost while picking apples.
But in this dream, the daughter lives and
the animals won't die. They're reborn into
pale eggshells, they break free from pie plate,
up from bubbling filling phoenix, and each
speaking things you later can't recall. All
you know is that the table's full-the hobo
John, the minister's wife, your children young
with school friends. They laugh and gape in
wonder, as if such unexpected guests were
what they'd wanted to be served all along.

I•
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Turn That Stuff Down
The Need for Silence in Music
Jennifer Forness

0

LDER

GENERATIONS

FREQUENTLY

complain that their children's music "all
sounds the same:' A recent study published in Scientific Report confirms this complaint:
pop music really is getting louder. "Measuring
the Evolution in Contemporary Western Popular
Music" examined 464,411 distinct music recordings from 1955 to 2010 available in the Million
Song Dataset. Researchers ran the songs through
a series of complex algorithms to quantify harmonic sequences, timbre, and loudness of music
in a variety of genres, including rock, pop, hiphop, metal, and electronic. The study found that
over the years, pop music has moved toward
simpler harmonic progressions, more predictable and consistent timbres, and overall louder
volume (Sera et al2012).
That current pop music has fewer harmonies and timbres is not surprising. Much of what
draws youth to popular music today is the "beat"
of the music rather than interesting progressions
and sound combinations. If you listen to any pop
radio station for long, you cannot help but notice
that much of the music is very similar. Blogger
Scicurious recently (August 13, 2012, http:/ /scientopia.org/blogs/scicurious) pointed this out.
The first twenty seconds of Nicki Minaj's "Turn
Me On" consist of eight bars of synthesized beats
followed by the lyrics "Doctor, doctor, need you
bad, hold me babe" sung over the same chord.
Snoop Dogg's "Sweat" opens with four bars of
synthesized beats followed by the lyrics "Can
you be my doctor? Can you fix me up?" over the
same chord. If you are not listening carefully, you
might not even notice when the song changes.
Even more worrying than the homogeneity of
recent pop music is its increasing volume. Recent
changes in recording technology have resulted in
records becoming louder, a phenomenon known

as the "loudness wars:' In today's digital formats,
music is compressed to fit into a smaller space.
This technique has the unfortunate consequence
of eliminating many dynamic contrasts. Instead
of relying on dynamic contrast, the recording
industry has adopted the philosophy that the
louder the record is, the easier it will be for people to recognize it and for the record to become
a hit. Matt Mayfield's "The Loudness War" on
YouTube illustrates the unfortunate effects this
approach has on music (http://www. youtube.
com/watch?v=3Gmex_4hreQ). Mayfield plays
the beginning of Paul McCartney's "Figure of
Eight;' noting how much punch the drums have
when they enter. He then plays the song as if it
had been recorded with today's compression levels and demonstrates how much louder the track
is. When the track is compressed, the drums lose
their punch, and the song becomes less effective.
While engineers and producers have played a
significant role in making pop music louder, the
artists are not without fault. Many artists have
pandered to changing tastes in pop music and
have written simpler, less dynamic songs. Much
of today's popular music has few or no breaks in
the volume; the songs are just loud from beginning to end. Unfortunately, the listener then loses
all the benefits of quiet and silence in music. The
listener needs periods of rest to react to a particular word or phrase that the artist has decided is
important. The contrast of loud and soft enables
the listener to explore how the music is affecting
him or her and to interact with the music and
use it in a meaningful way. The lack of dynamic
range prevents the listener from engaging with
the music in any but a superficial way.
A closer look at the punk/alternative band
Green Day demonstrates both how silence can be
used to great effect and how the lack of dynamic
Adve nt/Ch rist mas 2012
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contrast is a detriment. Their 1994 breakout album
Dookie featured a variety of songs about coming
of age in suburbia. The song "Longview;' with its
iconic bass line, explores the monotony of living
in the suburbs. The song starts off with the walking bass already creating boredom by repeating
itself four times before Billie Armstrong begins
to sing. The soft shuffle of the toms on the drum

set along with the bass give us time to absorb
how bored Armstrong is as he changes "channels
for an hour or two I Twiddle my thumbs just for
a bit:' Because the beginning is soft, the listener
is struck by the force of Armstrong's anger in the
chorus when the guitar begins to strum forcefully along with Armstrong's cry to "bite my lips
and close my eyes I Take me away to paradise:'
The contrast of soft and loud gives us time to feel
the tedium of living in the suburbs.
Almost twenty years later, Green Day's newly
released album, jUno!, shows how the changing music industry has affected the quality of
the music. The song "Kill the DJ" harkens back
to Green Day's punk roots with its insistence on
killing "the man." The track starts loudly with a
harsh minor guitar riff. Armstrong immediately
butts up against religion by complaining about
"Christian soldiers I Filled with mind jivin'
control:' Continuing with the same loud guitar
riff, Armstrong commands, "Someone kill the
32
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DJ, shoot the f***ing DJ." The rest of the lyrics
bring up angry complaints against religious and
cultural authorities and focuses mostly on the
phrase, "someone kill the Dr' In fact, Armstrong
uses variations of that phrase thirty times in the
song. Unfortunately, Armstrong never gives us
enough of a break from his angry complaints to
think about who the DJ is and why we should
be upset with him. Instead, all the listener gets
is the unchanging angry guitar riff throughout
the whole song. Unlike "Longview;' which gives
us time to wallow in our boredom, "Kill the DJ"
slams the listener over the head with the same
relentless complaint without giving the listener
space to explore how or why one might want to
get rid of "the man:'
Green Day's journey from "Longview" to
"Kill the DJ" illustrates how much louder and less
interesting much of popular music has become.
"Kill the DJ" bows to the whims of current listeners, while "Longview" falls into the tradition of
more dynamic bands such as U2 and The Beatles,
as well as most of Western history's popular
music. U2's "Where the Streets Have No Name"
engages the listener through its increasing sonic
ride. The nearly two minutes of crescendo at the
beginning of the song continue to rise once the
vocals peak at the end of the lyrics before beginning a slow descent to the end. The rise and fall
at both ends of the song give us time to absorb
the lyrics of the text. Going back further to The
Beatles, we hear the word painting in songs like
"Let It Be;' where the music always gets softer on
the phrase "Whisper words of wisdom I Let it
be;' making sure the listener has to engage more
closely as the song gets quieter.
Of course, silence in music extends beyond
the popular music of Green Day and The Beatles
to classical music. Impressionists like Debussy
use silence to great effect, giving the listener
time to reflect on nature and space. Beethoven
explores the space between loud and soft, helping the listener experience the extreme ranges of
human emotions. The alternation of recitatives,
arias, and choruses in a Bach cantata gives the listener time to hear and reflect on the word of God.
The music-and the silence-to which one listens encourages meditation on the meaning and

emotions in the music. One listens and receives
the richness of music through its silences.
Great pieces of music are meaningful
because the space which silence provides reso nates with human needs and experiences. Silence
rings true to the listener because it transcends.
Spiritual practices have always recognized this
need. Practices like visualization, prayer, and
meditation invite the faithful to become aware
of themselves and the ways in which God speaks
to them. Silence becomes a prayerful conversation during which one speaks to and listens to
God. In Keeping Silence: Christian Practices
for Entering Stillness (Moorehouse Publishing,
2002), C. W. McPherson writes that "cultivating
silence enables us to understand and recover our
own humanity; it serves as a catalyst, bringing
the presence of God into our lives and into the
world" (6). Silence in spiritual practices, as in
music, allows one to meditate on words or ideas,
reflect on their meaning in one's life, and explore
how they will affect one's thoughts and actions.
As faith practices demonstrate, silence is
essential to meeting our emotional and spiritual
needs. Perhaps this study will convince at least
a few song writers and performers that we need

dynamics and silence in music. Maybe we can
move beyond the loudness wars and finally turn
the volume back down. f

Jennifer Forness is the choir director at
Fisher Middle School and Ewing High School
in Ewing, New Jersey. She lives in Princeton,
New Jersey with her husband and baby girl.
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RUMBLE STRIP
Speeding down the interstate at seventeen
in my parents' Thunderbird, I am out to show
I am fearless. Eighty seems a lifetime ago,
gauges rising, grill grinning at the GMC Jimmy
rattling in the passing lane. Cheers are heard
on the CB radio. My boyfriend's hands are pressed
against the dash. He looks at me, forehead creased,
speeding down the interstate in my parents' Thunderbird.
I am not fearless. I can't prove that I'll make it
past ninety with my future husband I will meet
four years down this road. A future daughter sits
buckled in and yells, "Slow down!" son kicks my seat
and points, "TRUCK! TRUCK!" never consider
parents, younger brothers, my nervous passenger
or his future wife and daughters, families
and cars I pass as if I have nothing to lose
or gain on this freeway, dotted white lines
speeding by on this open road, like ellipses.

Sarah Wells
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No Truth or Reconciliation
Patrick Flanery's Absolution
Joanne Myers

HE CHARACTERS IN PATRICK FLANERY'S
spliced with sections that narrate Sam's childnovel seem unable to believe in the poshood experiences in the third-person and with
sibility for grace evoked by its title.
excerpts from a fictionalized memoir that Clare
Absolution follows two white South Africans, Sam
is about to publish and that, in a further twist, is
Leroux and Clare Wald, as they try to make sense
also entitled Absolution. Quite early in the novel,
of both their interlocking
Flanery lets readers know
personal histories and their
that Sam and Clare have
ties to the violent politics
more than professional ties,
of their nation in the apartbut their personal connecheid- and post-apartheid
tion comes to light sooner
eras. As the novel's multiple
rather than later, serving as
plots unfold, absolutiona less significant driver of
for crimes both personal
the plot than subsequent,
and political-is desired but
more significant revelations
also deferred, an infinitely
that entangle them further.
vanishing point toward
In her first-person nar~""""
which Flanery's characrative, Clare is the character
ters move without hope of
more obviously seeking forarrival. Professional storygiveness. These sections
PATR I CK F LA N ER Y
tellers of different sorts,
detail her wary interactions
Clare and Sam nonetheless
with Sam, whose scholseem to have lost faith in
arly acumen she regularly
narrative's ability to capinsults, but they also trace
ture the truth. And without
her pained attempts to
truth, the novel suggests,
understand her daughter
what kind of absolution
Laura, an anti-apartheid
is possible? The question
militant who went missing
Atlantic 2012.
clearly resonates in the
years before and is preSouth African context, but
sumed dead. Clare wants
it is not always clear whether Flanery wants readto understand her daughter's actions, which she
ers to apply his characters' dilemmas to modern
describes as "both too great and selfless as well as
life more generally.
too dishonorable and horrific to be called heroic"
The novel's narrative threads are complexly
(253). Even as she grapples with her inability to
interwoven. Ostensibly, professional causes bring
prevent her daughter's turn to violence, Clare
the protagonists together: Clare, a novelist, has
seems to envy her clarity of purpose. The sections drawn from Clare's version of Absolution
reluctantly acceded to have her biography written and has chosen Sam, an expatriate academic
cast her as the victim of a home invasion-a
living in the US, for the task. Sam's and Clare's
common occurrence given the tense racial situfirst-person narratives in the novel's present are
ation of contemporary South Africa but also,

T

Absolution
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in Clare's version of events, an act of revenge
for careless remarks, made decades earlier, that
may or may not have led to the murder of her
sister and brother-in-law. As Clare meditates on
Laura's inarguable guilt-the "dishonorable and
horrific" guerrilla campaign in which she was
engaged-she considers her own more questionable culpability as mother, sister, and novelist
under apartheid. Unsure how to fix the blame for
crimes undertaken on behalf of a greater good,
Clare is also anxious because she does not clearly
have a crime to which she can confess. "Even if

Absolution is elusive but
also desirable, because it can
retroactively invest one's actions
with significance. To seek to be
absolved is to make a claim that
one has done something.

the crime is not a crime as such;' she tells her
son, Mark, "I do and can only regard myself as
guilty of something like criminal negligence,
or if not negligence, then recklessness .. :' (287).
Absolution, these sections suggest, is elusive
but also desirable, because it can retroactively
invest one's actions with significance. To seek to
be absolved, for Clare at least, is to make a claim
that one has done something, that one is not, as
she intermittently fears , "[n]othing but a paper
tiger in a paper cage" (349).
Sam's sections heighten the narrative's
suspense by revealing glimpses of his own relationship with Laura, of which Clare is imperfectly
aware. They also narrate his awkward reacclimation to life in a country that is less racked by
violence than in his childhood but still charged
by an atmosphere of constant danger. Sam's pursuit of Clare is both dogged and diffident, and
the narrative provides little clarity-which Sam
himself does not seem to possess-about what
36
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exactly he wants from her. Dated sections that fill
in the gaps in Sam's childhood help clarify some
of the tensions in their relationship, providing
details of a further connection between Laura
and Sam's parents, also ANC militants, who died
during a botched terrorist operation.
Initially, readers expect Sam to serve as a foil
for Clare, whose habitual narcissism and tendency
to evade responsibility establish her unreliability
as a narrator. But as the novel progresses, Sam's
status as the diviner of the truth erodes, and he
ultimately seems, if not disinterested in the truth
of the past, mistrustful that the truth can bring
any consolation-or absolution. The complexity of the novel's plot seems designed to amplify
the question, on which Flanery repeatedly
focuses, of how the stories we tell ourselves are
fragile and vulnerable to distortion. Describing
her Absolution to Sam, Clare classifies it as "a
weird hybrid of essay and fiction and family and
national history... both fiction and something
that is not quite fiction but less than proper history or memoir" (341). Here, generic hybridity
functions, as the novel's fractured points of view
also function, to undermine the ideal of an accurate and full reporting of the past.
The South African context puts added pressure on the situation: Flanery alludes to and
provides fictionalized excerpts from reports
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) , that entity charged with suturing the
past's wounds via their narration. If the TRC's
work was premised on the assumption that a full
account of past horrors could serve as an adequate alternative to the more exacting pursuit of
justice, Absolution questions the ability of story
to be so faithful to history as to provide liberation from its claims and costs. At the same time,
Flanery's characters exhibit no post-modern
playfulness about the truth. Rather, Absolution
depicts individuals for whom the truth's inaccessibility causes an anguish that registers as
a flattening of self, an inability to grant either
desire or despair the authority to anchor identity.
At the center of the characters' lives-and
at the center of Absolution itself-is therefore a
kind of nullity. Absent a robust sense of truth,
notions of responsibility are leached of meaning,

,------------
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leaving absolution an absent presence. Hearing
his mother's confession of her past errors, Mark
declines to dignify them with the status of
crimes: "You have overplayed your role in history, Mother;' he tells her, "and I suggest you do
nothing else but get over it" (349). Sam gets at the
crux of the problem when he articulates how his
life has been shadowed by a notion of accidental
harm:
Accidents were always happening. He
had come from a country of accidents.
He tried to understand what this meant.
It seemed to mean that no one was ever
responsible for anything if only you
could tell the truth and most of all if you
could say you were sorry. But he had not
told the truth and he was not sorry.
Sam's focus on the accidental echoes Clare's
description of her own actions as "careless:' For
these characters, the links between causes and
effects are not only uncertain but ultimately
inaccessible. Framed by a theologically resonant
concept, the struggles of these characters play
out in a resolutely secular world. Sam and Clare
cannot imagine making sense of all that has gone
wrong in their lives by making an appeal beyond
the contingencies of history. The accidental is
that for which no one can be blamed, for which
absolution is beside the point.
At points, Flanery seems to want to distinguish Sam from this economy of the accidental.
Sam, after all, "had not told the truth and he was
not sorrY:' One way to understand Sam's flatness
as a character is to see him as unwilling to forge
an identity, as Clare does, by glamorizing mistakes as crimes. But Sam proves as unable as the
other characters to pinpoint tragedy's causes by
applying to the past a richer moral vocabulary.
If absolution's grace seems inexplicable to these
characters, so is the notion of evil. Violence past
and present pervades the novel like a smog, its
causes beyond pinpointing. Despite his exposure
of the fiction ofthe accidental, Sam tries to mitigate the horror of his parents' violent death for
his American wife by explaining that "You have

to understand it in context. It was an accident. It
wasn't supposed to happen the way it did" (277).
Without a more nuanced way of understanding the damage people can do to one another,
Sam is as unable as anyone else to resolve the
past's ambiguities, or to extend or accept absolution. The question of how things went so wrong
for him, for his parents, and for Laura-and
hence the possibility that those wrongs can be
repaired-must go unaddressed.
At the level of plot, this means that the novel's
climaxes, moments when scraps of truth finally
emerge, are curiously understated. Readers may
well find themselves frustrated as the characters
seem unable to acknowledge the stakes of the
truths they learn-an inability that ultimately
feels like an evasion, on the novel's part, of defining absolution in this starkly-lit, Godless world.
Flanery has set up his characters' interlocking
problems cleverly, but Absolution ends by refusing
to grant the truth, as it has come to be understood, any purchase on the characters' outlook.
"I am prepared for the biography, when it finally
appears, to bear no resemblance to the drafts he
shows me;' Clare muses in conclusion. "I hope
that will not be so, but as much as I have-almost
despite myself-come to love him and believe all
that he tells me ... I do not trust him, and never
shall" (386). Unabsolved, ungraced, untrusting,
Absolution's characters end up much as they
began: alone with their own ambiguous versions of the truth. It is not always clear whether
Flanery wants readers to see their predicament
as unique to the South African context or part of
secular culture more generally; the novel's setting
gives him a fertile ground for raising questions
about the road from truth to reconciliation, but
its lingering ambiguities mean that readers may
not understand how precisely to get from there
to here. ;

Joanne Myers is Assistant Professor of
Engl ish at Gettysburg College.
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BUILDING
"The youth gets together his materials
to build a bridge to the moon .... the
middle-aged man concludes to build
a woodshed with them:'
Thoreau
These are the planks of our youth.
We will haul them out.
Here are the nails we collected in jam jars;
here the nuts and bolts we bought with pennies.
Far in the back of closets are the meticulous plans
sketched in the margins of comic books
and faded school assignments.
We will break open the toolbox
rusted from neglect.
We will grasp the old weight
of hammer and saw.
The earth and sky remember
our eyes. We will begin.

Marjorie Maddox
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Toward a Theol ogy of Zombies
A. Trevor Sutton

T

HIS STORY BEGINS LIKE A BAD JOKE:

A

clergyman and three zombie experts walk
into a room. They are presenting papers
at an academic conference. After the clergyman
presents his paper, a graduate student raises her
hand and asks: "Does the Lutheran faith have
anything to say about zombies?"
Through what must have been a clerical error, I was the lone clergyman on a panel
of zombie experts at a humanities conference
hosted by a Midwestern university. Since my
paper was about early Christian funerary art, the
conference organizers decided it would be best
to place me on a panel with three PhD students
working in the field of zombies. I lectured on the
dead; they lectured on the undead.
My fellow panel members addressed some
vexing zombie issues: Why are Haitian zombies
confused with filmmaker George Romero's zombies? In a full-fledged zombie apocalypse, is it
better to hunker down in a basement or ascend
to the tops of buildings? Can one ever fully
recover from zombification? These questionsostensibly jokes, yet debated with the utmost
seriousness-filled the allotted presentation
time and bled into the discussion period.
As the conversation lingered over the bacterial nuances of Haitian zombies, I drifted off
into my own zombified state of boredom. When
the discussion had reached undead levels of
monotony, a question was finally hurled in my
direction: "Does the Lutheran faith have anything to say about zombies?"
At first, I was tempted to say that
Lutheranism has as much to say about zornbies as it does about snipe hunts, unicorns, and
leprechauns. I resisted. As I thought about the
question, it became apparent that one thing
does unite the zombiologists and me: we both

love a good mystery. For zombiologists, love of
mystery drives them to speculate tirelessly about
an impending zombie apocalypse. For me, and
others in the Lutheran tribe, our love of mystery
allows us to hold a cornucopia of seemingly paradoxical beliefs.
Although both Lutherans and zombiologists love mystery, each group handles mystery
very differently; the very thing that unites these
groups also divides them. Mystery, for the zornbiologists on my panel, is an invitation to probe
deeper into ontological questions of being. For
them, a mystery is a problem begging for a solution. Mystery, for me, is a chance to marvel at
the miracle of creation. Life's mysteries call for
reflection, not dissection.
Zombies, or the notion of embodied
unconsciousness, can only exist in a world that
mishandles mysteries. Reductive science, with
its canine appetite for perfunctory answers, has
reduced the mystery of creaturely life down to a
series of mechanical components. If human life
is but a series of mechanical components, then
zombie life is what happens when these components go awry.
Take neuroscience as an example: researchers have fileted every nook and cranny of the
brain, with a haughty lot of them declaring that
creaturely life is merely the result of complex
operations within the brain. This expectation of
mastery over mystery is precisely what makes
zombiologists.
Zorn biology is an epiphenomenon of reductive science, a fascination that results from
imbibing too much Cartesian dualism. If the
recipe for a human is one part body and one
part soul, then the recipe for a zombie is merely
one part body and then substitute flesh-eating
bacteria for the soul. Zombie lovers, like ghost
Adve nt/Christmas 2012
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hunters, are the bastard children of traditional
Cartesian dualists; while ghost hunters are fixated on the possibility of the bodiless soul,
zombie lovers are fixated on the possibility of the
soulless body.
The desire to master the mystery of life is
not limited to zombie panels at humanities conferences. The attempt to dissect life down to
unrecognizable pieces goes beyond human subjects. Our food and animals have been subjected
to a thorough zombification. Salmon have been
genetically altered to grow at alarming rates.

While the zombie-loving
community may be experts on the
undead, Christ has made us experts
on the abundantly-lived life.

These aptly named "Frankenfish" are almost fish.
GMO plants can produce sterile seeds so that it
is almost a soybean. Meat from cattle has been
infused with some sort of pink slime so that it
is almost beef. This leads us to wonder: We have
zombie food, what is to say that we cannot have
zombie people as well?
Into the midst of this zombie chaos our
faith makes some mysterious assertions about
miraculous things. These declarations sometimes appear impotent. They are dismissed on
account of the questions they leave unanswered.
Take for instance the assertion that God formed
creatures from the dust of the earth. Is this dust
made of electrons, atoms, or quarks? And what
exactly is the divine glue used to hold this dust
together? Is it covalent bonds, quantum physics,
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or laminin proteins? Our mysterious claim
leaves these questions unanswered. It simply
says one thing: Life is from God.
Another mysterious assertion is that life is
from the breath of God. This leaves us wondering: What of the liminal state between breath
and breathlessness? What do we make of the
body's electrical signals long after clinical death?
What of the heart's spontaneous reperfusion
after being stopped for a time? To these questions we have only one mysterious claim: Life
comes from the breath of God. Life is removed
when the breath of God is removed.
The mysterious claims of our faith do not
account for all of the subtleties of reductive science. In fact, the mysteries of our faith add a great
deal of opacity to the conversation. Yet, in these
simple gems we find something of substance to
offer the zombie-loving community. While they
may be experts on the undead, Christ has made
us experts on the abundantly-lived life.
Our faith refuses to reduce life down to
anything less than a miracle. Mysteries are not
problems. Mysteries are not promptings for further inquiry. Instead, mystery is simply a part of
the creaturely experience. Into a world of chaos
we carry a handful of mysterious assertions. Our
claims answer few questions about zombies. Yet,
somehow the mysteries of our faith answer the
questions that are worth asking. ~

A. Trevor Sutton serves as pastor at St.
Luke Lutheran Church in Haslett, Michigan.
His newest book, Creature Life: God's
Story of Restoration, was co-authored with
Dr. Charles Arand and is being published
by Concordia Seminary Press.
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Theologies of Academic Freedom
Lake Lambert

A

COMMON

NARRATIVE

ABOUT

HIGHER

education in the United States juxtaposes
academic freedom and sectarian religious
identity. As the story is often told, academic freedom increases when religious identity diminishes,
and vice-versa. Indeed, the same story is told by
those who advocate for greater academic freedom
and by those who advocate for enhanced religious
identity. In The Soul of the American University
(1994), George Marsden bemoaned the fact that
many church-related colleges and universities
carelessly abandoned distinctive denominational
identities for a non-sectarian vision that valued a
particular version of academic freedom and cultural progress.
Much happened at the dawn of the twentieth
century to establish this narrative. As controversies
raged over historical critical methods of biblical
study and biological evolution, John Dewey and the
organization he helped establish-the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP)asserted that strong religious or denominational
identity and academic freedom were antithetical.
Denominational identity, claimed the AAUP, set
the religious authority of the church over against the
scientific authority of the professor. Moreover, the
sophisticated level ofexpertise inherent in scientificallygrounded professorial authority required that any
evaluation of the teaching and publications of professors be made exclusively by peers rather than by
denominational officials. The canonical form of the
narrative was eventually established in the AAUP's
multiple policy documents and the "Red Book"
that collects them.
The trouble with a canon, as with all orthodoxies, is how it marginalizes alternatives. In
"The Freedom of Teaching" (1883), the American
philosopher Josiah Royce offered a different philosophical foundation for academic freedom, arguing

that the freedom of the educator was necessary
due to the "disputed problems" higher education
addressed. While Dewey found the basis of academic freedom in the expertise and authority of the
educator, Royce found it in the necessity of doubt
and continuous investigation in the task oflearning.
According to Royce, all college- or universitylevel teaching engages "disputed questions of principle, of method, of scope, and of result;' and as a
consequence, the professor "must himself be, as
far as in him lies, an investigator" who encourages
students to be investigators themselves (237). The
necessary condition to make this possible is academic freedom. As Royce states it, "The very air of
investigation is freedom" (238) .
Royce was no friend of doctrinaire denominational colleges that made the professor into a
"mouthpiece" for someone else's ideas. However,
Royce, by grounding academic freedom in questions
and doubt as opposed to independent expertise,
was much more in line with educational methods
previously embraced by Western Christianity. For
example, Thomas Aquinas asserted that doubt was
necessary in the pursuit of truth, and he structured
the Summa in the scholastic method of disputed
questions that required readers to engage in alternative arguments before truth could be discovered.
Likewise, the Protestant reformers embraced
humanism's search for truth by questioning established doctrine and returning to original sources.
The problem, as George Marsden argued, was that
American higher education in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries embraced a liberal
Protestantism that endorsed tolerance and nonsectarianism as theological virtues but did not
provide a bulwark against arguments like Dewey's
that valued expertise while marginalizing faith.
Many serious theologians and denominational loyalists do not see the choices so starkly
Adve nt/Christ mas 2012

41

Godsey to defend both, and he did so with arguments that were distinctively Baptist. Writing in
the student newspaper soon after Roberts's letter
became public, Godsey sought to define Mercer's
identity as a Baptist university with an uncompromising support for academic freedom. Godsey also
made specific connections to Baptist theology and
especially to the tradition's long commitment to
religious freedom. While he never explicitly used
the phrase, Godsey repeatedly alluded
to what Baptists recognize as "soul
Protestant and Catholic academics
competency" or "soul freedom;' the theological idea that "each person's journey
can begin with different premises but end
of faith must be tenaciously respected:'
Theologically, the concept of soul comup in the same place as equally forceful
petency is the Baptist basis for expecting
personal conversion and limiting bapadvocates for academic freedom precisely
tism exclusively to individuals who
in colleges and universities that take their
confess belief. It values the individual and
freedom of thought, insisting that ideas
denominational identities seriously.
be engaged without threats of coercion
and only by the power of the Holy Spirit
on the human soul. According to Godsey,
while answering secular critics for whom academic
this was the foundation for Mercer's theology of
academic freedom as well.
freedom is necessary for respectability. In his book
At the University of Notre Dame, issues of acaAcademic Freedom and Christian Scholarship
(2000), Anthony Diekema, former president of
demic freedom emerged in 2006 at the beginning
of Father John Jenkins's presidency. The impetus
Calvin College, contends that the arguments for
was three planned events on campus: a Queer Film
academic freedom are too often based on an episFestival, a performance of The Vagina Monologues,
temology of "objectivity and pure rationality" that
and a series of presentations and papers by female
has been largely rejected by the academy itself.
students on abortion, contraception, and other
Instead, all arguments for academic freedom are
issues in human sexuality that were united under
grounded in some type of worldview, and worldthe title of "Her Loyal Daughters:' Over several
views may differ by institutional mission. Some
months, Father Jenkins and the university as a whole
may continue to find their basis in objectivity and
articulated a pragmatic yet theological understandexpertise, but there is not and should not be a sining of academic freedom in the Catholic context.
gle universal grounding for academic freedom.
Academic freedom, said Jenkins in an address to
At my own Mercer University, twenty-five years
the faculty on January 23, 2006, is a "sacred value"
ago academic freedom was tested by charges put
but one with boundaries nonetheless. He explained
forward by a Baptist layman in a letter sent to "all
that his concerns over the three events were "not
Georgia Baptists:' Among the many charges made
with censorship but with sponsorship:' The issue
by Mr. Lee Roberts of Atlanta were that the teachat hand was not the academic freedom of the facings and writings of Mercer's president, Dr. Kirby
ulty or even of individual students but instead the
Godsey, were heretical and that Mercer University
appropriateness
of academic units and university
Press published works contrary to the teaching
of the Georgia Baptist Convention. Although the
organizations sponsoring certain kinds of events.
In perfect conformity to AAUP documents, Jenkins
charge of heresy was directed at him personally as
clearly defended the academic freedom of faculty
much as it was at the university as a whole, it fell to

as academic freedom versus religious orthodoxy.
Protestant and Catholic academics can begin with
different premises but end up in the same place as
equally forceful advocates for academic freedom
precisely in colleges and universities that take their
denominational identities seriously. These faculty and administrators have crafted theological
arguments that defend academic freedom against
denominational leaders outside the university
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to teach and conduct research subject only to
peer review as well as their freedom in extramural
utterances. While Jenkins noted that Notre Dame
should be open to speakers or events that conflict
with Catholic values, he cautioned that sponsorship
of such events by units of the university might create the appearance that the university is endorsing
those views rather than ensuring that a variety of
views are engaged.
Four months after Jenkins identified this distinction between censorship and sponsorship, he
and department chairs within the College of Arts
and Sciences issued their "Common Proposal" for
how potential issues should be resolved, specifically
invoking the Catholic principle of "subsidiarity" as
their guide. The principle of subsidiarity has a long
history in Catholic social thought; it claims that
decisions should be made at the lowest level possible
in societies and even in organizations. In this case,
Father Jenkins and the chairs proposed that within
the university "departments are best situated to
decide what events should and should not be sponsored and to explain the nature of the sponsorship"
and that "the President should rarely be involved
in such day-to-day matters:' The statement repeatedly mentions the need for Catholic teachings and
perspectives to be part of the ongoing dialogue at
the university as well as the final authority of the
president in all matters. Through its invocation of
subsidiarity, Notre Dame was able to align itself
with the AAUP standard of disciplinary experts
being the primary decision-makers over what ideas
should and should not be publicly presented at the
university, while at the same time invoking a longrespected principle of Catholic teaching.
Unlike Mercer and Notre Dame, California
Lutheran University (CLU) did not articulate its
understanding of academic freedom in response
to an issue or concern but took a more proactive
approach through the work of a presidentiallyappointed committee seeking to define the
institution's denominational identity. In a committee document with a title borrowed from the
university's motto-"Love of Christ, Truth and
Freedom: The Lutheran Character of California
Lutheran University" -the committee asserted that
"Love of Truth" requires a vigorous defense of academic freedom as well as a commitment to promote

both theological literacy and to provide occasions
for an encounter with the Christian Gospel. After
describing Martin Luther's identity as a university
professor, the statement adds that "neither Luther
nor the tradition he inspired fear challenge, debate,
or diversity of views. These simply magnify the
complexity of the Creation and further glorify the
Creator:' There is also remarkable consistency in
the university's documents relating to academic
freedom, including a guide for new faculty and
staff stating that "the university supports academic
inquiry and a scholarly quest for truth in all disciplines, believing that scientific inquiry and insights
of faith are complementary ways of pursuing the
wholeness of truth:' Even the university's faculty
handbook begins with Lutheran theology before
moving into a direct quotation from the 1940
AAUP statement on academic freedom and tenure.
Theologies of academic freedom tell us something about the identities of faith-based colleges
and universities as they seek to uphold the values
of both academy and the church. For the academy,
institutional support for academic values creates
legitimacy and aids faculty recruitment and retention, and for the church, institutional support for
theological ideals also creates legitimacy and may
aid ongoing church support in funding and enrollment. Attacks against academic freedom from
inside denominational circles require responses
from shared denominational sources of authority. Colleges and universities that seek to renew
their denominational identities must provide a
theological accounting for how a denomination's
theology is compatible with academic values like
academic freedom. Finally, academic freedom can
have diverse sources, theological as well as secular,
allowing many faith-based institutions to preserve
their identities while upholding one of the most
important and widely shared scholarly values.
Church-related higher education would benefit
from more theologies of academic freedom. These
theologies would mine the depths of denominational traditions as well as the traditions within
traditions that established and maintained colleges
and universities for over a century. Hauge Lutherans
may have something different to say than Loehe
Lutherans or "happy Dane" Lutherans. Likewise,
Holy Cross Catholics may have something different
Advent/Christmas 2012

43

to say than Franciscans or Dominicans. Even
Baptists at Mercer call themselves "Mercer Baptists"
to distinguish themselves from others and to tie
ourselves back to our namesake Jesse Mercer who
was a passionate advocate for religious freedom and
who even wrote the religious freedom clause of the
Georgia Constitution. Most importantly, theologies of academic freedom will allow church-related
colleges and universities to embrace this highest of
academic values because of their denominational
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traditions rather than in spite of them, making the
traditions alive and more meaningful to the academic vocations of teachers and students. t

Lake Lambert is Dean of the College of
Liberal Arts at Mercer University.
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THIN PLACES
"Thin places are ... where the veil
momentarily lifts, and we behold God."
Marcus Borg, The Heart of Christianity

In the slim space between the body
of the i and its dot, between any
letter and a comma, between the two
ts in little, between the e and a in beauty
itself, is almost God, almost Word-not
quite, but some place sheer enough
to spell us for a while until the merest
places close down on sin to suggest
a single sentence, simple prose,
spare and lucid as "Let there be light:'

Mary M. Brown

-·
44

The Cresset

·- ... .

-

religion

-

Insecurity
Thomas C. Willadsen

I WOULD
not get anything done today. This is the earliest
I have ever made such a designation. Usually
it dawns on me at about 4:00 in the afternoon
that my day has been completely unproductive.
After more than twenty years in ministry, I know
when I need to give myself a "fallow day;' put
my responsibility addiction on hold, lower my
expectations, and muddle through.
My day started at 3:45 AM . The Voice from
the church's insecurity system phoned me about
an intruder at church. The police had been called.
"How soon can you get there, and what will you
be driving?"
"Ten minutes. A red Prius."
We've had the insecurity system for twelve
years. For some reason our insurance company
required that we get it when we installed the
elevator. So far it has never alerted us to a fire
or burglary. It has alerted us to malfunctioning
smoke detectors and staff members who have left
the building after the system has armed itself for
the night. Once I was phoned at 1 AM because a
smoke detector was sending an error message. I
thanked the Voice for waking me and went back
to sleep. The Voice phoned again. "The Oshkosh
Fire Department has been called because the
northeast stairwell fire detector has gone off:'
"What am I missing?" I asked. I assumed the
sensor was broken, but if it was not, and there
really was a fire, I figured I could drive past the
smoldering ruins at first light.
"They asked that you be there:'
At this point I'm wondering, "Do they need
me to say, 'I'm Pastor Willadsen and I approve
your fighting this fire'?"
I pulled on my sweatpants and met the fire
fighters, and we confirmed that the smoke detector was on the fritz. I returned home. Monday we

I

KNEW AT 11:30 THIS MORNING THAT

called the smoke detector people. I asked, "Could
you make these things malfunction at 10 AM on
a weekday?"
"You pay extra for that:'
Last Wednesday, our choir director stayed
late after rehearsal to file some music. She left the
building after the system armed, and the Voice
called to inform me, "There has been a breach at
the East Door:' This did not sound serious, but it
did sound rather personal. I walked through the
building, and turned off four lights that different
groups had left on. I went to the East Door and
found two of Oshkosh's finest there. Luckily, they
did not open fire when I walked out. And they
took me at my word when I said unto them, "''m
the pastor." I was home in fifteen minutes and
rested comfortably the rest of the evening.
The police department used to tug on the
church doors to see whether they were locked
as part of their regular duties. Once one of them
pulled a little too hard and made the system think
the door had been opened. The Voice called me
about a possible intruder. I met the officer. His
build reflected his occupation's legendary fondness for donuts. He insisted that I walk through
the building with him looking for the intruder.
We walked through the basement. We walked
through the main floor. We walked through the
second floor. When we were nearly done, I said,
"You know where I'd hide if I were an intruder?
The bell tower! Let's go up there!" The bell tower
is at the top of a steep twenty-step spiral staircase. "No one up here? Go figure! Thanks for
checking this out with me!" Officer Cruller was
winded and wet with sweat after ascending the
staircase. He never tugged on the doors again.
This morning was different. There were three
police cars on the street when I arrived. The glass
back door of the church had been shattered. The
door was ajar; it could not close because of all
the broken glass in the jamb. While they were
deciding whether to enter the building to look
for an intruder, another officer radioed that he
had found some bloody sweatpants on the front
yard of the church. I walked down one side of the
building and found an officer on the corner holding a rifle. I retreated to another corner of the
property when the officer suggested I wait in my
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car. My church was a crime scene around which
they formed a perimeter. I watched from the car
as the torches of four officers flashed throughout
the building.
About that time, I spotted a young woman
sitting on the curb across the street. At first she
was screaming; then she turned docile. A few
minutes later, an officer downgraded her condition to "remorseful." I do not know whether they
took her to the hospital or the pokey. One of the
perimeter officers informed me that I could enter
the building. I reset the insecurity system. I went
to my office and got the cellphone number of our
property guy. I swept enough glass off the jamb
so the door could latch. I returned home at about
5 AM, but didn't exactly sleep.
At 7 AM I called the property guy. Then I
called the secretary, the preschool teacher, and
the custodian. By 8 AM a new door had been
ordered, and the glass had been cleaned up. By
3 in the afternoon we had a new door. Insurance
will cover it, and the church will probably even
get its deductible back as restitution, the police
suggested.
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At 8:30PM I was sitting in a restaurant twenty
miles from home, meeting a colleague for breakfast as I do each month. I drank too much coffee.
We talked about all the things that seminary
never prepared us for. Things like insecurity systems, SWAT teams, random acts of vandalism,
and the reality that some days you are simply not
going to get anything done, besides musing on
the plight of not getting anything done. I ate supper with our after-school group. I talked to one
of the classes about communion. I headed home
at the usual time for a Wednesday, more than fifteen hours after my day began.
And so to bed. ~

The Rev. Thomas C. Willadsen is pastor
of First Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh,
Wisconsin.
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The Election Issue That Wasn't
But Shou ld Have Been
Geoffrey C. Bowden

T

HAT THERE WAS NO SERIOUS DISCUSSION

of our well-known, but secret, drone war
in the Middle East and Africa during the
Presidential election of 2012 was both mysterious and depressing. If the United States is indeed
actively engaged in the practice of flying unmanned aerial drones over countries toward
which we are not openly hostile and launching
missiles at unsuspecting people on the ground,
then this seems like something we should talk
about, especially when we are in the process of
attempting to decide who to give the power to do
such a thing.
This is how the drone war appears to operate: The president and a team of advisors
regularly meet to discuss the "kill list" (on "Terror
Tuesday") which is the climax of a process that
seems to begin with a "disposition matrix;' a
futuristic term used to describe an assessment
tool that determines the extent to which a person
is a terrorist threat and how best to deal with that
person (Miller 2012). If someone is unfortunate
enough to land on the kill list, normally the CIA
will use its local "assets" in proximity to the person to "tag" a car or dwelling used by the "target"
with a GPS device, at which point a drone will
locate the GPS signal, fly within range, and fire
a missile at whatever the GPS device is tagged to
(Smith 2012).
It seems like a misnomer to call this a "war;'
since it more closely resembles an assassination.
However, when these actions are done at the frequency we are doing it, the term "war" becomes
apt. And the term "assassination" implies a surgical strike that limits damage to the intended
target, but reports indicate that this is hardly
the case with drone attacks. Hundreds of civilians have been killed in Pakistan alone, including
176 children (Ponnuru 2012). Alarmingly, the

President's justification for these civilian deaths
is that he "in effect counts all military-age males
in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is
explicit intelligence posthumously proving them
innocent" (cited in Ponnuru). So if you are of
a certain age that we normally associate with
Islamic terrorists and happen to be in the drone's
"strike zone;' you are an enemy-combatant of the
United States regardless of whether you intended
to do the United States harm or not. Guilty until
we can prove you innocent, after we have killed
you. The moral of the story: be very careful with
whom you hang out in the Middle East.
Why didn't the drone war ever emerge as
a political issue in the presidential election of
2012? Surely this was a vulnerability for President
Obama, who made serious political hay in 2008
by criticizing the Bush administration's prosecution of the War in Iraq as immoral and potentially
illegal. For Obama then to prosecute his own war,
though one of a vastly different variety, with little
or no constitutional/legal framework for doing
so would seem to make him open to criticism on
both moral and legal grounds, not to mention
grounds of hypocrisy. The first and most obvious
answer is that President Obama and Governor
Romney did not differ much on the use of drones.
When Romney was asked about the use of drones
in one of the debates, he responded "I support
that entirely and feel the president was right to
up the usage of that technology and believe that
we should continue to use it to continue to go
after the people who represent a threat to this
nation and to our friends" (quoted in Ponnuru).
Neither candidate desires to appear passive in the
age of global terrorism, and what better way to
destroy that appearance than to fire missiles at
"threats" every so often? Second, presidents and
potential presidents desire one thing: power. It
Advent/Christmas 2012
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never fails. No matter how much they campaign
on restraining the power of the executive, on
waging a "humble foreign policy" (Bush in 2000),
or on curbing past executive excesses (Obama in
2008 on closing Gitmo), presidents and potential
presidents who understand the nature of the job
always keep open possible methods of increasing
the power of the office. To make the drone war
an issue in the election is to put a spotlight on it,
drawing public, moral, and legal scrutiny that can
only lead to restrictions. Apparently the Obama

administration has been making moves toward
erecting a moral and legal framework around the
drone war to restrict the power of future executives, but only time will tell if this framework will
have real teeth (Stableford 2012).
Perhaps a deeper answer is in order, however. The fact that the drone war and the War
in Afghanistan were essentially non-issues in
this election reveals a nation that is war-weary
and has little patience for complicated and
emotionally-draining debates over the ethics of
war. There is a deep fissure in America's collective mindset about war. Yes, we have been at war
for over a decade now, with a heavy ground presence in two countries, and many American men
and women have died, not to mention many nonAmericans. War-weariness results from seeing
people lose their lives in a conflict that seems to
be going nowhere, with no achievable and wor48
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thy objective in sight, but this war-weariness
pertains only to real conflicts, to actual "bootson-the-ground" wars where we invest money
and man-power in this tragic and ancient practice. Our weariness does not extend to the idea of
war. In fact, it is not a stretch at all to suggest that
American society and culture, guided by a political
culture with plenty of incentives to wage war, has
made peace with the idea of war, the idea of killing
others to achieve our goals on a global scale. We
will wage war if it is in our national interest to do
so, and maybe only if it
is in our national interest to do so. So-called
"humanitarian wars" or
wars waged to spread
democracy to oppressed
peoples do not sit quite
as well with Americans,
especially if we are
going to see our own die
in the process. But the
idea of war, well, we can
generally see the merits
of that.
There is a difference
between
Americans
being comfortable with
war as a hypothetical
and Americans being at peace with this or that
particular war where their sons and daughters
are doing the fighting . But if we can come to grips
with the ethics of "war-in-general;' we should
do so only through the particular wars that we
fight. Pragmatic necessity spurs philosophic
inquiry. Over time, when we perceive the necessity of fighting this or that war and agree that it is
acceptable to ask our young people to fight those
wars, then we ascend to a notion that war can be
morally acceptable and even obligatory at times:
we develop a "theory of war." The experiences of
particular wars trigger a process of moral deliberation through which we forge a position on the
morality of war in general. But herein lies the
difference with the drone war: Americans never
experience it. We have no skin in the game, as
it were. What forces us to consider the ethics
of a particular war is that we have to make the

enormous decision about whether we should sacrifice some of our own people or money for this
cause. With the drone war, that decision never
enters the equation. The drones are un-manned,
controlled remotely from sites in the United
States. And a drone attack is relatively inexpensive, especially when compared to a large ground
invasion. So, why would Americans ever expend
the mental energy to think about whether drone
attacks are morally acceptable or legal? Drone
wars do not trigger moral thinking about war;
we have no reason to think about "particular
instances" in the drone war, because we do not
experience the loss of human-capital or money.
It is possible that at some point in the future
Americans will engage in a vigorous public
debate about the ethics of using un-manned
aerial drones to assassinate enemies or potential enemies, but we clearly have not reached

that point yet. The normal trigger that forces us
to think philosophically about the morality of
war has been eliminated from the moral equation with the drone war. Until then, the use of
drones will no doubt increase, achieving some
of the goals of the CIA, while also generating an
ever-mounting civilian casualty count and a host
of moral and legal questions. ~

Geoffrey C. Bowden teaches in the
Department of Political Science and Public
Affairs at Savannah State University, with
specialties in ethics and politics and political theology.
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SLIVERS

I
i
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I recognize us running freely effortlessly
my brother and I alone, one chasing
the other in the overgrown empty lot
next to our childhood Michigan home.
I can see hastening feet blur as we bolt
between skeletal deprived bushes the height
and breadth of children our age-at the time
imagined foes. Unable to discern faces

I
I

I instead recollect shared laughter, the dry
salty taste of open-mouthed breathing, breath short
because we were too young to breathe any
deeper. Separated by just under a year, we

li
I!

hadn't yet the capacity to fully rememberimages flash only long enough for slivers
of light to appear in the time of idle darkness,
jagged fragments illuminating the measured space

IIli

surrounding the frame of a cracked bedroom
door. And, in this dim room, we still sleep.

Jennifer Hurley
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The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism Revisited
or Pride Gaeth Before a Fall
H. David Baer

T

WENTY-ONE YEARS AGO THE SOVIET UNION

collapsed, marking the end of an era. After
forty-five years of the Cold War, liberal
democracy had emerged triumphant. Developing
nations across the world looked to the United States
and Western Europe for models of success. Francis
Fukuyama wrote a book titled The End of History,
in which he argued that Western-style liberal
democracy represented the end point of political
evolution; Michael Novak republished The Spirit of
Democratic Capitalism, in which he defended the
superiority of free markets to planned economies.
Today, however, the West is in crisis. In the
United States, the securitization of mortgages
within a highly opaque and poorly regulated
financial sector led in 2007 to a massive market
failure and the greatest economic crisis since the
Great Depression. In Europe, structural defects
with the common currency coupled to high levels of sovereign debt have pushed some nations
into deep recession, threatening Europe's political
integration and stability. When developing countries search for models of success, rather than
look to the West, they often look to China, with
its undemocratic, state-sponsored capitalism. The
ability of free markets to outperform all competitors can no longer be taken for granted; the
superiority of democratic capitalism is no longer
self-evident. What went wrong?
The answer to that question is multifaceted,
but underlying every facet of the answer may be
a truth first discerned by Solomon, "Pride goeth
before destruction, and a haughty spirit before
a fall." The United States has been the world's
unchallenged economic and military superpower
for twenty years, and unrivaled supremacy makes
for complacency. "See, see but do not perceive;'
writes the prophet; "make the heart of this people
fat:' A fat-hearted people, concerned with comfort

and privilege, refuses to notice signs of impending
crisis until after it comes. In America, the failures
of our domestic politics are only now becoming
apparent.
We now know, for example, that the financial sector was not functioning anywhere near as
well as the free marketers told us. In her recent
book Bull by the Horns (Free Press, 2012), Former
FDIC chair Sheila Bair describes the way "deregulatory dogma'' deluded Washington elites, both
Republican and Democrat, into believing that
markets and institutions could regulate themselves. As she explains:
The groupthink was that technological innovation, coupled with the Fed's
seeming mastery of maintaining an easy
monetary policy without inflation, meant
an end to the economic cycles of good
times and bad that had characterized our
financial system in the past. The golden
age of banking was here and would last
forever. We didn't need regulation anymore. (Bair 17)
Momentous financial crises, like those we experienced in 2007 and 2008, just weren't supposed to
happen anymore. Called to testify before Congress
in 2008, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, whose commitment to the idea of
the self-correcting free market was frequently
described as ideological, could only express his
"shocked disbelief" that financial institutions had
failed to monitor themselves, and then reluctantly
acknowledged a "flaw" in his system of thought.
However, to attribute the cause of our present
discontents to the financial sector alone would
be too easy; "Does a bird fall in a snare when
there is no trap for it?" Over the course of the
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last two decades, Americans have fallen prey to
a bowdlerized version of free-market philosophy,
according to which markets produce prosperity
automatically, and no one ever has to sacrifice
or attend to the health of civil society. Perhaps
nowhere is this self-deception more striking than
in our tax code, riddled through and through
with exemptions, deductions, credits, and loopholes. Although the inefficiency of the tax code
is universally acknowledged, its inequity is some-

Over the course of the last two
decades, Americans have fallen
prey to a bowdlerized version of
free-market philosophy, according
to which markets produce
prosperity automatically, and no
one ever has to sacrifice or attend
to the health of civil society.

times overlooked. Every tax exemption is a form
of government subsidy. The popular mortgageinterest deduction, for example, costs the federal
government four times as much in lost revenue as
the amount it spends directly on public housing
for America's poorest quintile (see The Economist,
"America's Tax System;' October 13, 2012). But
because this subsidy is hidden in the tax code, its
middle- and upper-class beneficiaries can extol
the virtues of the free market without ever noticing their own hypocrisy. For a moment, such
hypocritical self-deception was rudely exposed
by Mitt Romney's infamous reference to the 47
percent, not only-as was quickly pointed out in
the press-because a large percentage of the 47
percent are Republicans, but also-as was not
much noted-because the wealthy donors whom
Romney addressed, deducting their mortgage
interest and health insurance premiums from
their taxes paid on investment income at a lower
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rate than wage earners, are themselves enormous
beneficiaries of government largesse. What is this,
if not "to falsify the balances with deceit"?
Self-serving appeals to a free-market philosophy preached but never practiced have also
blinded Americans to the problem of growing
income inequality. In the mid-twentieth century,
economists used to argue that while inequality
increases in the early stages of industrialization, it
decreases as economies develop. Today, we know
that this is not necessarily the case. Since 1980,
the share of national income in the United States
going to the top 1 percent has doubled from 10
percent to 20 percent; the share going to the richest .01 percent has jumped from 1 percent to 5
percent. Judged by a standard measure called
the Gini coefficient, the level of inequality in the
United States is starting to move uncomfortably
close to that of a South American country like
Brazil. Although economists used to believe that
a growing economy benefits everyone, the evidence now suggests that those on the bottom and
middle end of the income distribution are falling
behind in absolute, not just relative terms. Wage
income is stagnating (see The Economist, "World
Economy, For Richer, for Poorer;' October 13,
2012). Whatever the moral issues, economists are
telling us in increasing number that large disparities in wealth pose an economic problem. Joseph
Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World
Bank and winner of the Nobel Prize, argues in
The Price of Inequality (W W Norton, 2012), that
large inequalities render an economy inefficient
and unstable. Summarizing his views, Stiglitz
writes:
Inequality weakens aggregate demand,
because those at the middle and bottom
have to spend all or almost all of what
that they get, while those at the top don't.
The concentration of wealth in recent
decades led to bubbles and instability, as
the Fed tried to offset the effects of weak
demand arising from our inequality by
low interest rates and lax regulation ....
Mainstream economic institutions like the
International Monetary Fund now recognize the connection between inequality

and a weak economy. (New York Times,
October 26, 2012)
Moreover, growing income inequality in
America appears to be a symptom of diminishing equality of opportunity. Economists seeking
to measure the extent to which the income of
parents influences the income and educational
attainment of children have developed something
called the "inter-generational elasticity of income"
coefficient. According to this measure, parental
income explains half of the differences in children's outcomes in the US, which is worse than in
virtually every country in Europe, including much
maligned socialist Sweden (see, The Economist,
"Economic Opportunity;' October 13, 2012) . Nor
can one attribute inequality in America simply to
the workings of the market. American inequality
is exacerbated by a skewed but invisible welfare
state, one that distributes wealth upward by means
of a Byzantine tax code and redistributes wealth
from the young to the old through a system of
entitlements.
Severe inequality, if left uncorrected, can lead
to political crises. To be sure, some inequality is
unavoidable, but if too much of a nation's wealth
ends up in the hands of the few, a country becomes
divided into factions with conflicting and irreconcilable interests. Such societies cannot discern a
common good and may cease to cohere. Ancient
Rome was wracked by civil wars caused by plebian
resentment of aristocratic privileges, which gave

rise to dictators and the end of the Republic. The
twentieth century was tormented by left and rightwing totalitarianisms originating in reactions to
social failures caused by earlier forms of capitalism. US history also knows its social upheavals
and dangerous forms of populism.
These are truths we have forgotten, lulled
into a sense of security by our self-congratulatory
faith in the inevitability of history. History, however, records failure as well as success. It tells the
tale of nations that declined and fell after failing
to meet the challenges which confronted them.
Only a stiff-necked people would believe its own
history is destined to be different. Democracy
doesn't happen; it is built and tended to. Its success depends on effort and honesty and qualities
of character which, surveying the political landscape, would appear in short supply. If the heart
of the people is fat, no government of the people,
by the people, and for the people can hope long to
prosper. For democracy in America, a new birth
of freedom may depend upon a change of heart. f

H. David Baer is Associate Professor of
Theology and Philosophy at Texas Lutheran
University.

Advent/Christmas 2012

53

DURING EXODUS
A goldfinch hit the window
During that part in Exodus
(Your child was reading it to us)
About the years of manna.
I looked for where it came from,
The thump, not knowing what it was,
And there it was on the grass,
Plump at my foot, ruffling some,
And there I saw its story.
Beside it, another, cold,
A tail tipped yellow, not gold,
White frost circling its eye,
Hoary as manna I imagine:
Brother, worth keeping;
Feather, not ruffling;
An eye without light's leaven.
I bent down to see if the other,
The one that made the thump, was hurt.
It flew before my touch, alert
Not for salt; something brighter, colder.

Steven Walters
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Reviewed in this issue ...
Elaine Pagels's Revelations

R

EVELATIONS:

VISIONS,

PROPHECY,

AND

Politics in the Book of Revelation offers a
new look at the Book of Revelation from
the perspective of Elaine Pagels, best known for
her work with the Nag Hammadi Library-the
collection of so-called "Gnostic Gospels:' The
Gnostic Gospels are a series of codices (little
books) found in Egypt in 1945, dated from the
third and fourth centuries. These texts are
called "Gnostic" partially for their hidden
spiritual meaning, or
gnosis, but also after
the sect that gave
birth to them, the
Gnostics.
Several
earlier
Christian
leaders
including Irenaeus and
Tertullian attacked
the Gnostic movement, branding it
heretical because its
adherents expressed
views at odds with the acceptable doctrines of the
Christian Church.
If you do not own a translation of the
Gnostic Gospels and have always been curious about them, Revelations is an easy way to
gain some exposure. The book takes a polemical
tone describing how religious authorities have
used the Book of Revelation as a tool to thwart
the Gnostic movement since it first emerged.
Pagels, in fact, questions whether the book ever
should have been included in the Bible at all and
states that it was not the product of an Apostle.

She posits that the defenders of early Christian
orthodoxy invented the idea that John, the
beloved disciple of Jesus and witness to the crucifixion and resurrection, wrote the Apocalypse.
She holds that the real author was another John, a
frustrated Jewish prophet/writer of no reputation
who, shortly after the Roman war, was bent on
lashing out at the Romans and Gentile converts
of Paul of Tarsus.
If you are a
REVELATIONS:
little rusty on your
history,
VISIONS, PROPHECY AND church
Revelations
will
POLITICS IN THE BooK
either confuse or
OF REVELATION
delight, depending
on your orientation
Elaine Pagels
to and appreciaViking Press, 2012
tion for traditional
256 pages
Christian thought.
$27.95
The Church considers the Gnostic
Gospels apocryphal
Reviewed by
(of doubtful au thenDon W. Davis
ticity) since they are
pseudepigraphical
(ascribed to authors who did not actually write
them). Pagels asserts that defenders of orthodoxy
had political reasons for stomping out the Gnostic
cause, but fails to mention the real reasons why they
did so. The early Church rejected Gnostic views
not so much because the early Church Fathers
were rigid about establishing orthodoxy (although
they certainly were), but because the Gnostics did
not believe in Jesus' divinity or physical resurrection. Gnostic writings of the third and fourth
centuries were frowned upon because they did
not meet the minimum requirement of apostolic
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authority and authorship and also because they
contradicted other works (biblical ones) that did.
Bear in mind as you read Pagels's book, when she
says Revelation(s), she means the Gnostic ones and
when she says Revelation (no s), she means the
biblical one. In an effort to put Revelations on par
with Revelation and to level the playing field for
the Gnostics, she challenges the Revelation in two
ways: 1) She calls into doubt the book's apostolic
authorship, and; 2) She criticizes its inclusion in
the New Testament canon.
Most scholars, including Pagels, believe that
the Book of Revelation was written around 95 AD
near the time of the Roman Emperor Domitian's
death. She tells a story of how her John turns up
in Ephesus to distribute his book of propaganda
after a brief exile on the Isle ofPatmos. Once back
on the mainland, John of Patmos goes to work
sending his prophecy to the seven churches in
Asia Minor, namely Ephesus, Smyrna, Thyatira,
Laodicea, Pergamon, Sardis, and Philadelphia.
This story is not unlike the traditional version featuring John the Apostle. He too was
exiled to Patmos and at the death of Domitian
returned to Ephesus, where the Christian Church
had re-established itself after being driven from
Jerusalem. The seven churches were all in a circular route from Ephesus, relatively near one
another. Christians believe John the Apostle
started these churches himself and was regarded
with reverence and affection by their bishops.
They believe this because the Book of Revelation
was read in those churches immediately after it
was circulated, and there exists testimony from
some of the bishops of those churches as early as
the beginning of the second century. It is difficult
to imagine Pagels's John of Patmos, furious with
Rome and Gentile converts, gaining traction in
the seven churches. Since they knew nothing of
him and his prophecies, it is more likely he would
have offended their congregations than delighted
them. A sweep of all seven is hard to fathom.
It is not so hard, on the other hand, to imagine
the Apostle gaining immediate traction in those
churches led by bishops he had put into place
before his exile.
At four different places, the Book of
Revelation claims to be written by "John." The
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author speaks with authority in chapters two
and three to the bishops of the seven churches,
starting with Ephesus. The author has thorough
knowledge of what is going on in each of these
churches as he comments on their strengths and
weaknesses in minute detail. That this John was
the famous Apostle comes from an early, reliable source-Irenaeus, who was a native of Asia
Minor living near Smyrna where Polycarp, one of
the three principal Apostolic Fathers, was bishop.
Polycarp converted to Christianity by means of
direct interaction with the apostles of Christ. He
personally knew and communicated with many
who had seen and heard Jesus. Polycarp knew
John the Apostle, according to Irenaeus who
called Polycarp a disciple of the Apostle. Irenaeus
did not know the Apostle, but did know Polycarp.
Irenaeus quotes from the Revelation again and
again in his works as the product of the Apostle.
An Ephesian contemporary of Polycarp,
Papias, attests to the book's inspiration, which
implies that he knew it was apostolic. In one of
the fragments of his works, Papias seems to refer
to two distinct and separate Johns in Ephesus at
the time:
I would inquire for the sayings of the
Presbyters, what Andrew said, or what
Peter said, or what Philip or what Thomas
or James or what John or Matthew or
any other of the Lord's disciples, and for
the things which other of the Lord's disciples, and for the things which Aristion
and the Presbyter John, the disciples of
the Lord, were saying.
The possible reference to a second John in this
fragment is where the conspiracy theories of
another John originate, theories that Pagels takes
to a whole new level. The fact that there are two
separate tombs in Ephesus bearing the name of
John adds fuel to the fire, but a careful reading of
the fragment is not definitive. Papias could have
been referring to the same John in two different
ways and, regardless of the rendering, he did not
attribute authorship to either. No one made much
of this until the fourth century when writers were
looking for ways to soften the Christian message

after the Romans legalized the religion under
Constantine.
Pagels contends that the earliest testimonies of apostolic authorship were manufactured.
She accuses Irenaeus and Justin Martyr of making the whole thing up: "when critics charged
that a heretic had written it, its earliest defenders sought to lend it legitimacy by insisting that
Jesus' own disciple John wrote its prophesies" (2).
It is particularly distasteful that she would accuse
the early Church Fathers of making up apostolic
authorship when she herself offers no evidence
whatsoever that any such John of Patmos ever
lived.
Pagels also tells us that the early Christians
panned the book and few ever paid attention to it.
She writes: "Ever since it was written, Christians
have argued for and against it especially from
the second century to the fourth, when it barely
squeezed into the canon to become the final
book of the New Testament" (2). Again, the facts
seem to point in the opposite direction. There
were very few, mostly anonymous, detractors
of the book until 247 AD, when Dionysius of
Alexandria built a case that the Apostle could not
have written it. Dionysius noted what he believed
were stylistic differences between the Book of
Revelation and the Gospel of John and John's
Epistles. He felt it odd that John mentioned his
own name in the Revelation, whereas he never
did so in the other works of his hand. Scholars
since have debated the stylistic differences, which
do seem to exist, but the most obvious answer for
this is that John wrote down the vision exactly
as it unfolded on Patmos. Pagels believes, rather,
that John of Patmos contrived the book for political reasons and that the style he used ("wartime
literature" she calls it) was a method intended
to put forward certain coded, political messages
(7). Dionysius himself believed the work to be
inspired, as Pagels notes, but not authored by the
Apostle.
Perhaps Dionysius did not give enough
weight to the fact that the author was exiled to the
Roman mines under guard and saw these visions
in a cave, probably without much scribal help to
record them. In Ephesus, where the Christian
church hierarchy had transferred many resources

from Jerusalem after the war, there was a cadre of
Greek writers and scribes that could have worked
with the text once it was in their care, but exiled
on Patmos John was on his own with at most
one scribe to assist him. Since he was told in the
vision to write down exactly what he saw (Rev.
1:19, 22:18,19), he may have insisted that changes
not be made to the raw text upon his return to
Ephesus. Perhaps Dionysius should have excused
the fact that John's Greek was not smoothed out

The objections raised in regard to
the apostolic authorship of the Book
of Revelation are thin, late, and
subjective. They were made long
after the fact and far removed from
the region where the author lived
and the work was disseminated.

for that reason and acknowledged that he chose
to drop the self-deprecating practice of omitting
his name from his own work because this was
not his own work, but rather Jesus' own revelation. John likely identified himself because the
emperor had banished him from the land of the
living and was unsure as to whether he would survive. His job-as he probably saw it-was to get
the vision out to the seven churches at all cost. In
the case of his untimely demise, it would be more
readily accepted if it bore the Apostle's name. He
calls himself John because he is the Apostle writing to his own flock. He does not need to identify
himself further.
Another source for Pagels is Eusebius, who
in the fourth century picked up on the reference to two Johns of Papias to put forward a
theory that Presbyter John may have actually
penned the Book of Revelation, rather than
the famous Apostle. Even Eusebius wavers and
at times implies that the book is apostolic. It
is conceivable that Eusebius, in his efforts to
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present the history of Christianity at the onset of
the Imperial Church in the best light, was simply
walking back the harshness of the Apocalypse in
its apparent allusions to Rome.
A reasonable conclusion to the objections
raised in regard to the apostolic authorship of the
Book of Revelation by the time of Dionysius and
Eusebius must be that they are thin, late, and subjective. They were made long after the fact and far
removed from the region where the author lived
and the work was disseminated. The evidence for
the Apostle having written it on the other hand,
is strong, objective, and found in sources dated at
or near the time of the writing, and in the region
where it was written and distributed.
Turning to Pagels's second challenge, the
canonization of the Book of Revelation, she states
that it was left off of many lists of canonical books
until the time of Constantine (161), which is not
quite accurate. The book did not make it into the
New Testament, as she would have us believe, by
hook or by crook, but rather by the overwhelming
consensus of the majority of councils, list makers, and influential writers, including those who
knew the Apostle and accepted the Revelation
as his work. The book was in the early canons
from 170 to 400 AD including the Muratorian,
Apostolic, Athanasian, and Augustinian canons,
and was accepted by councils in 325, 393, 397,
and 419 AD. The first council to reject it was the
sixteenth council, the Laodicean Council, in the
middle-fourth century. Laodicea was spoken of
very negatively in the Revelation, as neither cold
nor hot (Rev. 3:15), which may account for its
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exclusion by them. It was restored by the very
next council.
If one can step outside the polemic, Pagels's
Revelations produces some real gems, such as
the analysis of the battle in heaven described in
Revelation as a recurring motif originating in
Babylon (26). There are several such diamonds
in the rough, with tasty bits from the Gnostic
Gospels themselves, making this book worth
reading. Finally, the book ends on a sweet note
worthy of concluding with: "Whether one sees in
John's visions the destruction of the whole world
or the dark tunnel that propels each of us toward
our own death, his final vision suggests that even
after the worst we can imagine has happened, we
may find the astonishing gift of new life. Whether
one shares that conviction, few readers miss seeing how these visions offer consolation and that
most necessary of divine gifts-hope" (175). ;-

Don Davis received a BA from the University
of Washington and studied Church History
and Ancient Greek at Fuller Theological
Seminary before rece1vmg an MA in
Religion from Liberty University and a PhD
from International Seminary. He lives with
his wife on Bainbridge Island, just outside
Seattle, Washington.

ON THE

€RES SET

on the web

www.thecresset.org
.,

.-...

-

POETS

Brent Newsom is Assistant
Professor of English at Oklahoma
Baptist University. His poetry has
appeared in Cave Wall, Tar River

Poetry, and elsewhere.
a

•
[

t

Subscribe to The Cresset.

t

Request a free sample issue.

tf

Find your favorite essays and

'

0

".

It

columns from back issues.

Submission Guidelines
What We Publish: The Cresset publishes essays, reviews, and poetry, not fiction. Essays that
we publish generally are not opinion pieces but expository, personal, or exploratory essays.
We will, on occasion, consider interviews or selected other genres. Almost any subject is
possible. We are highly selective about personal essays of faith experience and about homilies. The editor reviews all manuscripts and, when necessary, solicits opinions from members of an Editorial Board, consisting of faculty members at Valparaiso University.
Guidelines for Authors: 1. Our readership is educated, most with some church connection,
most frequently Lutheran. Articles should be aimed at general readers interested in religious
matters. 2. The Cresset is not a theological journal, but a journal addressing matters of import
to those with some degree of theological interest and commitment. Authors are encouraged
to reflect upon the religious implications of their subject. 3. Style and spelling are governed,
in most cases, by The Chicago Manual of Style and Websters New International Dictionary. 4.
We do accept unsolicited manuscripts; however, before submitting a manuscript, you may
want to contact the editor at cresset@valpo.edu about the suitability of your topic for the
journal. Our review columns (film, popular culture, music, and so forth) are usually supplied
by regular columnists. 5. The preferred method of submission is in Microsoft Word for Windows format. Email your file to cresset@valpo.edu. Or you may send your manuscript via
USPS to: The Editor, The Cresset, Huegli Hall, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN 46383.
6. Poetry submissions should be sent via USPS. Poetry submissions via email will not be
accepted. 7. The use of notes is discouraged. Notes of supporting citations should be placed
in parentheses in the text, listing: last name of the author, year of publication, and page
numbers where appropriate, e.g., (Wright 1934, 232). 8. ln a separate section entitled "Works
Cited;' list alphabetically by author (and, within author, by year of publication) all items that
are cited in the text. Provide complete bibliographical information, including author's first
name, publisher, and place and date of publication. Examples:

Bass, Dorothy, ed. Practicing Our Faith: A Way of Life for a Searching People. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1997.
Wright, Basil. "Filming in Ceylon:' Cinema Quarterly 2/4 (1943): 231 - 32.

_ _ .The Long View. London: Seeker and Warburg, 1974.

Becca J. R. Lachman teaches and
tutors writing at Ohio University
and is a graduate of the
Bennington Writing Seminars.
Her first book of poems, The

Apple Speaks, was published by
Cascadia Publishing
House (2012).
Sarah Wells is the author of
Pruning Burning Bushes from
Wipf and Stock Publishers
(2012). Her poems have appeared
or are forthcoming in Ascent, The
Common, Nimrod, and elsewhere.
Sarah serves as Managing Editor
for the Ashland Poetry Press
and River Teeth.
Marjorie Maddox is
Director of Creative Writing
and Professor of English at Lock
Haven University.
Mary M. Brown is Professor of
English and Chair of the Division
of Modern Language and
Literature at Indiana Wesleyan
University. She has published
poetry in many journals
including Fourth River and The

Christian Century.
Jennifer Hurley currently teaches
English at Valparaiso High
School. Her writing has appeared
in various literary publications,
including Etchings and
Valparaiso Poetry Review.
Steven Walters lives in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. His poetry has
appeared or is forthcoming in

The Cumberland Review,
Kestrel, and elsewhere.

Valparaiso
University
..,,

',

Shield of Character
The Shield of Character is one of the most important and powerful symbols of Valparaiso University.
At its center is the Light, the source of all truth, serving as a reminder of who we are and what we strive to be.
The Shield of Character reflects what we protect and defend as an interconnected Valpo community: the common set
of shared characteristics and values found among those who live and work here and those who have walked this campus.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

truth-seeking
free to inquire
humble
compassionate
service-minded
purpose-driven
empowered
ethical

Our Motto:

IN LUCE TUA VIDEMUS LUCEM
In Thy Light We See Light

